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ABSTRACT 
This study assesses the influence of old-age pension policy on older adults’ life 
satisfaction, and examines factors that shape this relationship.  It theorizes that two 
distinct dimensions capture variation in the type of pension policy: individualization of 
risk (as opposed to socialization, or pooling, of risk) and redistribution of resources (that 
is, poverty prevention through income redistribution mechanisms such as non-
contributory pensions).  To empirically evaluate the presence of these two dimensions 
and to assess their influence of life satisfaction among older adults, this study analyzes 
data for 126,560 adults age 45 and over living in 91 countries over the period 1981-2008.  
Using principal component factor analysis, it finds support for the two-dimensional 
model of pension policy.  Next, using three-level hierarchical linear regression, this study 
assesses the effects of pension policy individualization and redistribution on life 
satisfaction, generating three additional major findings.  First, redistribution increases life 
satisfaction, but individualization—on average—has no significant effect on life 
satisfaction.  Thus, the potential impact of individualization (whether positive or 
negative), and of the associated increased risk, choice, and opportunities for return, has 
been clearly overstated in theoretical debates on pension policy privatization.  Second, 
the relationship between pension policy and life satisfaction is contingent on the macro-
social context.  Specifically, individualization that takes place in more affluent societies 
has beneficial impact on life satisfaction, while individualization unfolding in contexts of 
material scarcity has detrimental impact on life satisfaction.  Further, the overall 
beneficial effects of redistribution on life satisfaction are substantially higher in the 
context of traditional cultures and lower in the context of secular-rational cultures.  A 
third finding is that governmental commitment to social security (i.e., government 
expenditures on social security as a percentage of total government expenditures) also 
shapes the relationship between the type of pension policy and life satisfaction:  Higher 
government commitment to social security substantially improves the life satisfaction 
outcomes of individualization.  Findings from this study are used to integrate and 
advance theory on comparative public policy and the larger macro-social context shaping 
subjective well-being.  Policy implications for pension reform are discussed, highlighting 
redistribution of resources and alleviation of need as more efficient avenues to increase 
older adults’ life satisfaction than privatization or pooling of risk. 
 
Keywords: pension policy, aging, subjective well-being, life satisfaction, 
individualization, redistribution, hierarchical linear modeling.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
As the world population continues to age into the 21st century, there is a growing 
need for research on the impact of old-age pension policy on well-being. Pension policies 
aim to secure older adults’ well-being by providing retirement income and preventing 
poverty (Holzmann and Hinz 2005). Replacement rates, contribution rates, and coverage 
are typically considered important criteria by which pension systems are evaluated.  In 
addition, the solvency of public pension systems and the risk of private pension systems 
have dominated policy debates during times of financial turmoil.  Although financial and 
coverage indicators are very informative about the well-being of older adults (e.g., 
Bosworth, Burtless, and Steuerle 1999; Munnell and Soto 2005), we cannot say that older 
adults live well if they deem the overall quality of their lives as unsatisfactory.  
Therefore, a fundamentally important question for research communities, policy makers, 
and public authorities is: What is the impact of old-age pension policy on the life 
satisfaction of older adults?  
Just as with financial indicators and other objective life conditions, subjective 
perceptions of well-being are increasingly adopted as useful social indicators to assess 
quality of life in the population (George 2006; Hughes 2006; Yang 2008). Life 
satisfaction (or overall happiness) is a widely accepted measure of the enduring and 
global aspects of subjective well-being and is frequently used to assess the degree to 
which people evaluate the overall quality of their present lives favorably (Diener, Suh, 
Lucas, and Smith 1999; George 2006).  When assessing pension policy performance, 
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measurements of life satisfaction of older adults have an important advantage over other 
common evaluative criteria; they are indicators of “realized” quality of life, whereas 
measures of solvency, replacement rates, contribution rates, and coverage are indicators 
of “potential” quality of life (Frey and Stutzer 2002; Veenhoven 2009).  The more 
satisfied the older adults are on average, presumably the better pension systems are 
performing (Calvo, Haverstick, and Sass 2009).  Measurements of quality of life in terms 
of life satisfaction are also useful to assess the degree to which countries meet the needs 
of their citizens and the extent to which their members can flourish in that environment 
(Veenhoven 2009).  
What do we know about the impact of old-age pension policy on the life 
satisfaction of older adults?  Research on pension policy is abundant as is research on 
subjective well-being.  However, for the most part these literatures are separate, with 
policy studies done within comparative-historical sociology largely restricted to OECD 
countries, studies within the framework of sociology of emotions and mental health 
biased towards microsocial scale studies of younger age groups, and studies done by 
sociologists of aging and the life course focusing primarily on the United States in its 
attempts to understand the relationship between policy and subjective well-being. 
If anything, however, previous research suggests that the type of pension shapes 
life satisfaction.  For example, retirees with defined benefit pension plans are happier and 
more satisfied with their retirement than those with either defined contribution plans or 
no pension coverage (Bender 2004; Panis 2003). Because having a defined benefit 
pension means that retirees receive a known flow of income, whereas having individual 
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accounts means having a sum of money that retirees need to invest in order to finance 
their entire retirement, it has been argued that retirees who do not have the certainty of a 
defined benefit may experience a decline in happiness as they progress through 
retirement and see their funds decreasing.  This strand of research, however, is mostly 
based on cross-sectional individual-level data for the United States and faces important 
methodological challenges (for a discussion, see Calvo and Sarkisian 2009; Calvo, 
Tamborini, and Sarkisian 2009).  We know very little about the influence of pension 
policy on life satisfaction across nations and over time.  Due to the lack of reliable cross-
national longitudinal data, researchers have not been able to observe significant variation 
in pension policy and the structural and cultural contexts in which policy is embedded.  
Furthermore, researchers studying mental health and emotions have focused on age 
groups other than older adults and outcomes other than life satisfaction. 
Previous cross-national research on non-monetary well-being outcomes 
emphasizes the influence of economic equality, global trade, class, and politics and 
primarily focuses on the status of children and women in different countries. Some of this 
literature has focused on predictors of infant and child mortality (Shandra, Nobles, 
London, and Williamson 2004; Shen, Sarkisian, and Tran 2008; Shen and Williamson 
2001, 1997; Wimberley 1990).  Other cross-national studies have explored the correlates 
of maternal mortality (Shen and Williamson 1999).  A third group of quantitative, cross-
national studies of mortality has focused on the determinants of life expectancy at birth 
(Crepaz and Crepaz 2004; Williamson and Boehmer 1997).  A few studies have explored 
the cross-national predictors of health among the aged (e.g., Shaw, Horrace, and Vogel 
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2005).  Also, several studies have explored the cross-national predictors of subjective 
well-being (Diener, Diener, and Diener 1995; O'Connell 2004; Ouweneel 2002; Radcliff 
2001, 2005; Stevenson and Wolfers 2008; Veenhoven 2009). However, none of these 
studies focus on older adults. Those studies that actually focus on subjective well-being 
among older adults do not use cross-national data (Arendt 2005; Bender 2004; Butrica 
and Schaner 2005; Charles 2004; Cheng and Chan 2006; Elder and Rudolph 1999; 
Fouquereau et al. 2005; Kim and Moen 2002; Panis 2003; Silverstein and Parker 2002; 
Westerhof and Barret 2005).  A few studies investigate the impact of social security on 
non-monetary well-being, but they focus on social security expenditures rather than the 
type of pension policy, and analyze populations other than older adults (Di Tella, 
MacCulloch, and Oswald 2003; Ouweneel 2002; Ouweneel and Veenhoven 1995; 
Radcliff 2001; Veenhoven 2000; Williamson 1987).  Despite popular wisdom assuming 
that quality of life is better for citizens of countries with a strong welfare state, these 
studies find small or no relationship between a variety of measures of social security 
expenditures and well-being.   
In sum, the lack of data and distinct focus of previous research on other outcomes 
than life satisfaction and younger age groups has resulted in fragmented findings and 
minimal sociological understanding of the effects that pension policy has on older adults’ 
life satisfaction. 
This study aims to address these limitations by integrating separate bodies of the 
literature such as comparative-historical policy analysis, sociology of aging and the life 
course, and sociology of emotions and mental health, assembling and utilizing a 
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multilevel longitudinal dataset, and using cutting edge methodology of three-level 
hierarchical modeling (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).  This study presents the first 
multilevel longitudinal analysis of the impact that old-age pension policy has on life 
satisfaction throughout the world. The analysis is based on a newly created dataset, 
including repeated cross-sections for a total of 126,560 individuals age 45 and over, 
nested within 91 high-, middle-, and low-income countries (the nested structure of these 
data is illustrated in Figure 1 and discussed in Chapter 3), observed between 1981 and 
2008. These data capture tremendous variations in pension policy as well as in the 
national contexts in which policies are developed.  
In order to understand the influence of pension policy on life satisfaction, this 
study poses its first fundamental question:  What are the main dimensions in pension 
policy variation?  Existing research has predominantly focused on social security 
expenditures as opposed to the type of pension policy, finding little if any effects of such 
expenditures on life satisfaction (Di Tella, MacCulloch, and Oswald 2003; Ouweneel 
2002; Ouweneel and Veenhoven 1995; Radcliff 2001; Veenhoven 2000).  In this study I 
take a different approach and focus on the type or structure of pension policy.  I theorize 
that two distinct dimensions capture variation in the type of pension policy: The first 
dimension describes a polarization between individualization of risk, on the one side, and 
socialization (or pooling) of risk on the other side.  The second dimension relates to 
poverty prevention through income redistribution mechanisms such as non-contributory 
universal or targeted pensions funded and managed by public institutions.  This second 
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dimension captures variation in pension policy between high and low levels of 
redistribution of resources and alleviation of need.  
A similar two-dimensional policy model has been recently formulated by Mares 
and Carnes (2009) to theorize about social policy in developing countries, yet it has been 
neither statistically tested nor generalized to other countries.  Two-dimensional policy 
models are also implicit, but neither formally developed nor tested, in previous 
comparative-historical research deconstructing the meaning of privatizing social security 
in the United States (Béland 2005b).  Accounts of recent privatizing reforms in Latin 
America also touch upon the dimensionality of pension policy, as they show that the 
region has combined improvement of individual retirement accounts (IRAs) with a 
significant comeback of public components in old-age income support (Calvo, Bertranou, 
and Bertranou forthcoming; Kay and Sinha 2008).  For the most part, previous research 
has a narrow focus on the individualization of risk that parallels the expansion of the 
private component of the pension system.  With few exceptions (Barrientos 2005; 
Barrientos and Hulme 2008; Bertranou, Solorio, and Ginneken 2002), variations in the 
redistribution and poverty prevention dimension have been widely overlooked or simply 
confounded with variations in individualization.  However, results from this study 
statistically demonstrate that pension policy variation in the recent decades has two main 
dimensions: individualization and redistribution.   
After empirically confirming that pension policy has two dimensions of variation 
in institutional design, I ask: How do pension policies that promote greater individual 
responsibility and privatization of pensions influence life satisfaction of older adults?  
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How do pension policies that promote redistribution of resources and prevent poverty 
through strong public safety nets influence life satisfaction of older adults?   
Despite the lack of empirical research that directly investigates these questions, 
theoretical literature suggests a strong relationship between pension policy and life 
satisfaction.  Overall, the theoretical literature suggests a negative influence of 
individualization on subjective well-being, but there is an ample range of predictions.  
Scholars that associate individualization with risk tend to be pessimistic (Beck 1992; 
Giddens 1990, 1999; Habermas 2001; Luhmann 1993), while scholars that focus on 
increased choice and opportunities for return typically take an optimistic outlook (see 
Boudon 2003 for a review; Baker and Simon 2002; World Bank 1994).   
The second dimension of pension policy, redistribution, is seldom discussed in 
connection to subjective well-being, but previous research unambiguously highlights 
beneficial (economic, health, and social) outcomes of non-contributory social assistance 
pensions (Bertranou et al. 2002; Heikkilä and Kuivalainen 2002; Help Age International 
2006; Johnson and Williamson 2008).   
Taking advantage of the longitudinal nature of the country-level data of the newly 
created dataset, I estimate within country effects of pension policy individualization and 
redistribution on life satisfaction.  I find a significant effect of redistribution of resources 
and alleviation of need on life satisfaction but—on average—no evidence of significant 
effects for individualization of risk.  The key challenge that pension systems pose for life 
satisfaction stems not from a high degree of risk but rather from eroded or dismantled 
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public safety nets.  Thus, policymakers have to take poverty prevention and redistribution 
of income as the main objective of pension reform and not a side issue. 
Next, this study poses a fourth question: Do the effects of pension policy vary 
depending on the cultural and economic context in which individuals live? That is, does 
pension policy operate similarly in traditional and secular cultures, rich and poor 
countries? The broader empirical scope of the newly created dataset enables me to 
consider cultural and economic conditions under which subjective well-being flourishes.  
Drawing from separate bodies in the literature, I theorize that effects of pension systems 
on life satisfaction are regulated by culture and shaped by structure. Specifically, I argue 
that the congruence/discrepancy between pension policy and the cultural and economic 
context may exacerbate or weaken the effect of individualization and redistribution on 
life satisfaction.  Results from this study support this theory and suggest that the effects 
of pension policy on life satisfaction are context specific. 
The last question that this study aims to answer is:  Does the relationship between 
the type of pension policy and life satisfaction vary depending on social security 
expenditures?  Previous research suggests that the main effect of social security 
expenditures on subjective well-being outcomes is weak or non-existent (Di Tella, 
MacCulloch, and Oswald 2003; Ouweneel 2002; Ouweneel and Veenhoven 1995; 
Radcliff 2001; Veenhoven 2000; Williamson 1987).  However, these studies do not 
explore the way in which these expenditures may change the relationship between the 
type of pension policy and life satisfaction.  Popular wisdom also assumes that a large 
fraction of governmental resources being dedicated to social security as well as generous 
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social security benefits improve the effects of pension policy individualization and 
redistribution on life satisfaction.  Findings from this study suggest that government 
commitment to social security—measured as government expenditures on social security 
as a percentage of total government expenditures— may help individualization to have 
significant beneficial effects on life satisfaction.  From the policy perspective, 
individualization appears to be a resource-demanding alternative for both the government 
and the overall economy.   
In the next chapter, I review the historical, theoretical, and empirical literatures 
that inform my study.  This is followed by Chapter 3, where I describe data and methods.  
I report results in Chapter 4. In the final chapter I discuss the findings and conclusions 
from this study, consider theory and policy implications, and propose directions for future 
research. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
A plethora of studies has been conducted on old-age pension policy, on one side, 
and subjective well-being, on the other side.  Contributors hail from various fields, 
including comparative-historical policy analysis, sociology of aging and the life course, 
and sociology of emotions and mental health.  This body of work, however, lacks the 
coherence needed for further accumulation of knowledge on this issue. Thus, the aim of 
this review is not only to summarize previous research and identify gaps, but also to 
present an overview of the impact of pension policy on the life satisfaction of older adults 
from a sociological perspective that can be helpful for moving forward research in this 
area.  
This chapter is organized into three sections.  In the first section I theorize that 
two distinct dimensions capture variation in the institutional design of pension policy: 
individualization and redistribution.  I review accounts of old-age pension systems and 
reform during the last three decades.  This review provides historical grounds for a two-
dimensional pension policy model.  The second section addresses theoretical 
controversies and supporting evidence about the effects of pension systems on subjective 
well-being.  It touches upon topics of risk, choice, poverty prevention, and income 
redistribution.  I end this section by addressing how the relationship between pension 
policy and life satisfaction is embedded in a larger cultural and structural contexts.  The 
third and final section of this chapter summarizes my research hypotheses. 
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2.1. Historical Trends and Variations in Pension Policy 
In this study I argue that at any given point during the last three decades, 
institutional design of pension policy can be characterized using at least two distinct 
dimensions.  The first dimension captures variation between systems that hold the 
individual responsible for the risk of aging and systems that socialize or pool the risk.  
The second dimension captures variation in the degree to which the systems redistribute 
income from high- to low-income groups and alleviate poverty through mechanisms such 
as non-contributory universal or targeted pensions.  Recent theoretical literature proposes 
that individualization and redistribution can be considered two separate dimensions when 
analyzing pension policy in developing countries (Mares and Carnes 2009).  The 
reliability and empirical generalizability of this two-dimensional pension policy model 
remains to be statistically explored. 
Existing research has predominantly focused on the differentials in 
individualization and socialization (or pooling) of risk (Waine 2006; Whiteside 2005).  
This narrow focus is in part the result of the conceptual framework proposed by the 
World Bank (1994) to analyze pension systems and design reforms.  This framework 
focuses disproportionally on the difference between social insurance and individual 
retirement accounts (IRAs) in addressing and managing the risks associated with aging.  
The dominant policy prescriptions during the last decades have either draw upon or 
criticized this conceptual and ideological repertory, for the most part relegating 
discussions about poverty alleviation and redistribution of resources to a subsidiary issue.  
The overarching emphasis on individualization is also partly the natural reaction towards 
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historical trends in pension policy change since the 1980s, which can be broadly 
characterized as a process of individualization or privatization.  However, comparative-
historical accounts of pension policy development during the last three decades also 
identify an expansion of non-contributory public pensions, suggesting that pension 
systems have two distinct sources of variation.  Although in this study I do not aim to 
model and explain pension policy trends, but to characterize variations in pension policy 
at any given point in time, reviewing historical developments in pension policy during the 
last three decades sheds light on the plausibility of the two-dimensional pension policy 
model of individualization and redistribution. 
Among the most important social changes over the 20th century are the 
establishment, expansion, and contraction of social policies that protect the individual 
against life course risks such as the loss of earning power resulting from old age or 
retirement (Brown 2005; Gillion et al. 2000).  Historically, the main source of old-age 
income support was the family. During the late 19th and most part of the 20th century, the 
state and the employers came to play a larger role.  Since the 1980s, however, some 
countries experienced a trend towards greater reliance on personal individualized savings.  
As illustrated in Table 1, the pension policy changes during the 1980s and 1990s 
have been characterized as a full or partial shift from pay-as-you-go (PAYG) to 
mandatory funded individual retirement accounts (IRAs) schemes. This involved shifts 
from contributions and taxes to contributions and savings as financing mechanisms, from 
variable to defined contributions, from defined to variable benefits, from social insurance 
to personal savings, from public to private management, and from state to individuals 
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assuming the risk (Calvo, Bertranou, and Bertranou forthcoming; Gillion et al. 2000; 
Munnell 2005).  The magnitude and speed of these policy changes varied substantially 
across countries (Mesa-Lago 2004; U.S. Social Security Administration 1979-2008). For 
example, countries such as Kazakhstan, Mexico, and Nigeria substituted pre-existing 
PAYG schemes with IRAs, while others such as Denmark and Sweden kept both systems 
open, financing benefits by a mix of public and private systems. Still other countries such 
as Colombia and Peru have introduced IRAs giving workers the options to choose either 
the public or the private component.  IRAs have also grown in importance as voluntary 
schemes in countries such as Canada and the United States. Differences acknowledged, 
what is common to all of these reforms is the individualization of risks.  
 
Table 1. Characterization of Pension Policy Changes During the 1980s and 1990s 
Characteristic  Pension Policy 
Scheme PAYG IRA 
Financing Taxes Savings 
Contributions Variable Defined 
Benefits Defined Variable 
Form Social insurance Personal savings 
Management Public Private 
Risks State Individuals 
Source: Adapted from Calvo, Bertranou, and Bertranou (forthcoming). 
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In explaining the adoption of these individualized policies, previous studies have 
emphasized a number of factors. The individualization of pension policies was 
precipitated by the outbreak of the debt crisis in the less developed countries in 1982 and 
the structural adjustment policies promoted by the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, and other multilateral lenders (Babb 2005).  Privatization was appealing 
because it pleased international lending organizations and provided much-needed 
revenues for governments facing large fiscal imbalances. Furthermore, IRAs constituted 
an alternative for mismanaged PAYG pension schemes strained by a rapidly aging 
population. They provided hopes to increase coverage and compliance through a 
strengthened linkage between contributions and pension benefits—workers would view 
their contributions as investments or savings rather than as a tax, and thus have more 
incentive for participating and contributing to the system. IRAs also were seen as an 
opportunity to stimulate savings and economic growth (World Bank 1994). Finally, 
global diffusion of neoliberal ideas also fostered the individualization of pension systems 
(Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007; Madrid 2003).  IRAs were officially promoted by 
the World Bank (1994) and other international organizations, and numerous governments 
increasingly began to rely on the advice of economists who were trained in the United 
States and tended to advocate for market-oriented reforms (Markoff and Montecinos 
1993). 
The overall direction of the policy changes during the late 20th century is usually 
referred to as to individualization, privatization, or welfare retrenchment in the social 
science literature (Esping-Anderson 1999; Huber and Stephens 2001).  However, during 
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the same period, comparative-historical research has also documented the expansion of 
public social protection mechanisms that have enhanced the access of low-income groups 
to retirement income in many nations (Barrientos and Holmes 2007; Bertranou et al. 
2002; Gill, Packard, and Yermo 2005; Holzmann and Hinz 2005; Mesa-Lago 2005).  
These mechanisms include non-contributory universal and targeted pensions.  Although 
means-testing limits the scope of beneficiaries covered, these policies clearly have a 
redistributive function (Mares and Carnes 2009). 
Chile constitutes a useful case study to illustrate this argument (Calvo, Bertranou, 
and Bertranou forthcoming). In 1981, Chile became the first country in what later became 
a worldwide wave of old-age pension reforms when it introduced mandatory funded 
IRAs and moved away from PAYG schemes. In recent years, without moving away from 
an individualized pension system, Chile initiated another major pension reform intended 
to address the problems created by IRAs, such as low coverage and replacement rates for 
low-income workers and women.  One of the most interesting changes was the creation 
of a public institution that manages two types of benefits: a minimum non-contributory 
benefit that is paid to the poorest 60 percent of the older adults, and a supplementary 
benefit for those workers with low IRA balances.  This new system is expected to reduce 
poverty and income inequalities as well as to increase coverage.   
A number of factors explain variations in redistribution during the recent decades. 
Political coalitions between wage earners and lower-income groups result in highly 
redistributive policies, while the opposite happens when wage earners create coalitions 
with higher-income classes (Mares and Carnes 2009).  The World Bank and other 
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organizations that promoted IRAs have changed their policy prescriptions to pay more 
attention to poverty reduction, coverage and equity, and to protect participants from 
market risks (Gill et al. 2005; Holzmann and Hinz 2005; Mesa-Lago 2005). Furthermore, 
recent volatility in global financial markets exposed private insurance beneficiaries to the 
full force of market risks previously assumed by the state or employers and placed many 
of them in the need of poverty prevention and social assistance pensions (Clark, Munnell, 
and Orszag 2005). This, in turn, has raised concerns regarding the individualization of 
pensions across the world and persuaded many scholars and policymakers to consider a 
whole new spectrum of pension reforms beyond socialization of risk. 
For many countries, the expansion of the redistribution dimension in pension 
policy has taken place in light of recognition of the problems created by IRAs.  However, 
these policy changes cannot adequately be described as the end of the individualization 
era (Béland 2005b; Calvo, Bertranou, and Berranou forthcoming; Kay and Sinha 2008; 
Mares and Carnes 2009).  While many countries have individualized their old-age 
insurance policies, which may have a regressive structure of benefits that preserves (and 
sometimes increases) market-based inequalities, some of the same countries have also 
introduced redistributive policies that explicitly provide benefits to the poor (Barrientos 
and Hulme 2008).   
In sum, historical trends in pension policy change have been largely characterized 
as individualization, though changes in redistribution and poverty prevention mechanisms 
have also been documented.  Comparative-historical research makes conceptual 
distinctions that resemble the categories of individualization and redistribution, but a two-
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dimensional policy model has only been formally proposed in theoretical research about 
social policy in developing nations (Mares and Carnes 2009).  In this study, I empirically 
assess the reliability of a two-dimensional pension policy model applied to a broader 
range of countries.  My focus is on variation in the institutional design of pension policy 
at any given point in time, not on exploring historical developments in pension policy.  
What are the consequences of pension policy individualization and redistribution for the 
subjective well-being of older adults?  The next section reviews theoretical contributions 
and debates that address this question. 
  
2.2. Theoretical Links between Pension Policy and Life Satisfaction 
Lay conceptions typically agree that quality of life is better in countries with a 
strong social security system, capable of pooling risks, preventing poverty, redistributing 
income, and providing generous benefits.  It is certainly plausible for social security and 
more specifically old-age pension policy to have an impact on subjective assessments of 
quality on life, particularly for older adults.  Unlike most other social security programs, 
old-age pensions benefit a large and easily identifiable population (Pampel and 
Williamson 1985).  In addition, older adults are typically entitled to pension benefits after 
reaching a number of years of work (and contributions), and for most of them, the 
retirement income that they receive is crucial to maintaining their previous standards of 
living.  However, previous literature has not tested whether individualization and 
redistribution in pension policy boost or harm life satisfaction. 
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The impact of pension policy on life satisfaction remains a controversy in 
scholarly and policy debates. Individualization shifts risk and uncertainty to the 
individual, but it also increases choice.  Although poverty prevention and income 
redistribution can offset risks and unequal outcomes of power struggles, non-contributory 
public safety nets have eroded in many countries and spurred in others and this may have 
substantial impact on subjective well-being.  In addition, the outcomes of 
individualization and redistribution may be context specific.  Pension policy may operate 
differently in traditional and secular cultures, poor and rich countries. Finally, welfare 
spending has been found to have little if any significant effect on subjective indicators of 
quality of life (Di Tella, MacCulloch, and Oswald 2003; Ouweneel 2002; Ouweneel and 
Veenhoven 1995; Radcliff 2001; Veenhoven 2000). 
Despite the significance of the intellectual and political traditions that I review in 
this section, a striking lack of theoretical clarity and empirical evidence marks these 
debates: socialization of risks is confounded with poverty prevention and redistribution of 
income, individualization of risks is equated with poverty and inequality, cultural and 
structural factors are rarely discussed, and the attention is largely limited to welfare 
expenditures rather than to the type of programs and institutional design of pension 
policy. Therefore, this section attempts to develop greater theoretical clarity by proposing 
the two-dimensional theory of policy variation that separates individualization and 
redistribution as well as by synthesizing diverse literature and specifying potential causal 
relationships between pension policies, the contexts in which they are embedded, and life 
satisfaction.  
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2.2.1. Risk, Choice, and Returns 
The most hotly debated issue in the literature on individualization of pensions is 
whether it has resulted in greater risk that reduces well-being or greater choice and 
returns that enhance well-being. This section attempts to sort through some of the 
literature on the risk versus choice and returns controversy as they relate to life 
satisfaction and subjective well-being outcomes. 
Pension schemes are subject to a variety of risks (Gillion et al. 2000; Shuey and 
O'rand 2004): economic (e.g., financial crises), demographic (e.g., global changes in birth 
and mortality rates), political (e.g., privatization and re-nationalization reforms in 
Argentina or benefits reductions in numerous countries), institutional (e.g., bankruptcy of 
financial institutions), and individual (e.g., uncertainty about future spells of 
unemployment and extreme longevity). Each of these possibilities introduces risk that 
anticipated pension benefits may be reduced or not received.  Because individualization 
shifts risk to the individual, “risk society” theory is typically pessimistic about subjective 
well-being outcomes and highlights increases in anxiety and negative emotions (Beck 
1992; Giddens 1990, 1999; Habermas 2001; Luhmann 1993). This literature suggests that 
the effect of pension policies on life satisfaction is inversely related to the amount of risk 
that individuals bear.  
“Rational choice” theory takes a different position, suggesting that at the same 
time as individualization of pensions increases risk, it enhances choice and opportunities 
for greater returns (Baker and Simon 2002; World Bank 1994). For this school of 
thought, choice is a fundamentally desirable condition that maximizes utility and 
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satisfaction (see Boudon 2003 for a review).  However, recent literature criticizes the 
greater return argument as an undelivered promise and highlights the dark side of greater 
choice.  After a quarter of a century of pension individualization reforms, the initial 
promise of higher rates of returns is deemed disappointing and extremely vulnerable to 
shifts in the financial market (Babb 2005; Mesa-Lago 2005; Williamson 1994).  Research 
on financial illiteracy has lowered the expectations about individuals making the right 
decisions in an individualized pension system (Clark, Munnell, and Orszag 2005; 
Munnell 2005).  Furthermore, psychological and economic research has identified 
numerous unforeseen undesirable effects of choice: people are hesitant about their 
decisions, get paralyzed, set unrealistically high expectations, make poor decisions, end 
up dissatisfied, and feel more guilt and shame when facing failures (Gilbert 2005; 
Schuartz 2004).  Interestingly, all of these detrimental effects happen even in 
circumstances where choices are few and not overwhelming (Botty and Iyengar 2006). 
Summing up, scholars emphasizing the increase in risk argue that 
individualization decreases life satisfaction, while scholars that focus on choice and 
returns have mixed opinions about the difficulties and opportunities that arise with 
individualization.  Overall, the balance suggests that scholars are inclined to see 
individualization as detrimental for life satisfaction.  Not only there are more decisions to 
make and profits to gain, but these decisions and gains happen in the context of higher 
(perceived and consequential) risk.  The lack of empirical research qualifying and 
assessing the positions in this theoretical debate is striking. 
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However, because most of the studies discussed in this section focus on 
individualization without considering independent variations in redistribution, the 
expected (positive or negative) impact of individualization on life satisfaction is likely to 
be overestimated.  The next section specifically addresses variations in redistribution 
through a discussion of the potential relationship between poverty, inequality, and life 
satisfaction. 
 
2.2.2. Poverty and Inequality 
Poverty prevention and income redistribution have not received the attention they 
deserve in previous literature and debates on pension policy, which have largely focused 
on contributory pensions and the endorsement or critique of individualization.  Recent 
publications by the Asian Development Bank (2001), Inter-American Development Bank 
(2000), International Labour Organization (2001), World Bank (2001), and numerous 
other international organizations acknowledge this gap and suggest an emerging 
consensus about the effectiveness of social assistance as a response to poverty, inequality, 
and vulnerability (Barrientos and Hulme 2008).  The World Bank, one of the major 
advocates for individualization during the 1980s and 1990s (World Bank 1994), has 
specifically argued that excessive attention has been paid to mandatory and voluntary 
IRAs, and that pension reform has not paid enough attention to non-contributory pensions 
that prevent or alleviate poverty in old age (Gill et al. 2005). 
Previous research highlights the economic, social, and health benefits arising from 
non-contributory universal and targeted pensions (Bertranou et al. 2002; Heikkilä and 
 22
Kuivalainen 2002; Help Age International 2006; Johnson and Williamson 2008).  
Economically, they reduce individual poverty, redistribute wealth, contribute to reduce 
household and overall poverty, and can stimulate the local economy.  Socially, children 
benefit when grandparents have pensions, family cohesion increases, the status of older 
adults improves, and they feel both independent and socially integrated.  Health benefits 
include access to food, medical care, and medication.  In many countries, the effects are 
striking.  For example, the social pension in South Africa has reduced the scale of old-age 
poverty by 94 percent and overall poverty by 12.5 percent (Case and Deaton 1998; Help 
Age International 2004).  Because older people care for children in one out of every four 
South African households, the whole family has benefited from the non-contributory 
pensions.  For many older adults, the pension means that they can afford to eat.  To my 
knowledge, no study to date directly explores the relationship between redistribution and 
life satisfaction or subjective well-being more in general. 
The strength of these mechanisms suggests that pension policies that prevent 
poverty and redistribute income can make a real difference for life satisfaction of older 
adults.  The subjective threat posed by individualization seems very minor or irrelevant 
when taking into account that for many older adults, non-contributory pensions can 
literally mean the difference between life and death.   
Do the effects of individualization and redistribution on life satisfaction vary 
depending on the context?  In the next section I explore the cultural and structural 
contexts under which the relationship between pension policy and life satisfaction may 
exacerbate or dwindle. 
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2.2.3. Cultural and Economic Context 
Pension policies are embedded in cultural and structural contexts that may help to 
explain how people react emotionally to these policies.  Theory and research on 
subjective well-being, policy change, culture, and economy have been the substantial 
focus of a number of subfields in sociological research, but for the most part these 
literatures are separate.  A call for integrative research in this area has been repeated 
across disciplines (Berkman et al. 2000; George 2006; Massey 2002; Turner and Stets 
2006).  In this subsection, I attempt to integrate different contributions to delineate a 
macro-social theory of subjective well-being emphasizing the cultural and structural 
conditions under which pension policies are more likely to increase or decrease 
subjective well-being. 
There is no doubt that culture and structure play a major role in shaping our 
reaction to pension policy, creating and limiting possibilities, stimulating some reactions 
and discouraging others, and dictating the script that we dramatize as actors in a theater 
(Stets and Turner 2007).  However, with a few exceptions (e.g., Collins 2004), 
sociological theories of subjective well-being have focused on microstructural factors—
power, status, and density of networks—without analyzing macrostructural forces that 
may impact life satisfaction and interact with pension policy in shaping subjective well-
being (Turner and Stets 2006).  Among the exceptions is research on economic prosperity 
and subjective well-being, which for many years tried to explain the weak link between 
the two and finally concluded that wealth has a positive influence on subjective well-
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being, though these benefits are marginally decreasing (Arendt 2005; Bonini 2008; 
Kahneman 2006).  
What is true of theories emphasizing structural factors also holds for theories 
emphasizing cultural factors.  Despite the cultural and constructivist bias in most 
sociological research, the few studies that elaborate theoretical connections between 
subjective well-being and broader cultural values are by and large done by psychologists 
(Arrindell and Veenhoven 2002; Clark 1997; Diener, Diener, and Diener 1995; Diener 
and Suh 2000; Peterson 2007; Suh and Oishi 2004; Veenhoven 2009).  This lack of 
sociological theories and research is surprising given the widespread belief among 
sociologists that life satisfaction is heavily determined by cultural and structural factors 
(Veenhoven 2009).   
The role of culture and economy has also been largely overlooked in the literature 
on pension reform, which tends to focus on political factors, such as the welfare state and 
the role of international organizations (e.g., Esping-Andersen 1996; Myles and Pierson 
2001).  Historic institutionalism theories of policy development have gained in popularity 
and to some extent displaced cultural and economic arguments about both policy 
development and policy outcomes (Immergut 1998; Orloff 1993; Pierson 1994, Skocpol 
1992).  Institutional approaches emphasize the impact of pre-existing political structures 
and policy legacies on policy development.  They attribute moderate explanatory power 
to economic arguments (e.g., Wilensky 1975) and criticize cultural arguments (e.g., 
Levine 1988; Lipset 1990) for being vague and essentialist (see the critiques by Pierson 
2001 and Skocpol 1990).   
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Despite criticisms, comparative-historical studies that emphasize cultural and 
economic factors suggest that specific challenges for the success of pension reform arise 
in the context of a traditional culture and low-income economy.  For example, recent 
studies characterize numerous societies in Latin America and Asia as organized around 
the principles of family, reciprocity, loyalty, and poverty (i.e., traditional culture and low-
income economy), and find that each of these factors shapes the unfolding of pension 
reform with respect to coverage, compliance, transparency, and fiscal stability (Calvo and 
Williamson 2008; Zheng, Williamson, and Calvo 2009). 
Because the present study looks at a greater variety of countries, a model to 
classify cultures and economies is needed.  The sociologist Roland Inglehart and his 
colleagues developed what now is probably the most widely accepted system of cultural 
classification (Inglehart 2008, 2003; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart and Klingemann 
2000; Inglehart and Welzel 2005).  In this study, I focus on the dimension of cross-
national cultural variation that these scholars refer as to traditional versus secular-rational 
values. (Note that the separation of traditional and secular-rational does not imply that 
traditional cultures are irrational.)  Cultures with traditional values place strong emphasis 
on religion, deference to authority, have a nationalistic outlook, and low levels tolerance 
for abortion, euthanasia, and divorce.  Cultures with secular-rational values have the 
opposite preferences on all of these topics.   
To classify the economic context, I focus on economic prosperity and more 
specifically on GDP per capita.  Considering the economic context is of crucial 
importance when designing a pension system and is likely to be as important to 
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understand its performance and outcomes.  By focusing on economic prosperity, I will 
also capture variation in a second dimension for cross-national cultural variation 
proposed by Inglehart and his colleagues: survival versus self-expression values.  
Cultures near to the self-expression pole give priority to self-realization and quality of 
life over economic and physical security, demand popular participation in decision-
making in economic and political life, emphasize tolerance of diversity, have high levels 
of interpersonal trust and sense of control, prefer to teach imagination and tolerance to 
children rather than hard work and thrift, and believe in technological and scientific 
progress.  Cultures emphasizing survival values have the opposite characteristics. 
The decision to focus on economic prosperity and more specifically on GDP per 
capita over survival or self-expression values is controversial in that sociologists disagree 
about the priority of structure over culture (or vice versa).  The roots of this controversy 
are usually traced back to a Marxist (Marx and Engels [1845] 1970) emphasis on “needs” 
and a Weberian (Weber [1905] 2002) emphasis on “ideas.” This issue continues to be 
matter of vivid debates in the discipline (e.g., Herrera 2007; Hitlin and Piliavin 2004; 
Kohn, Naoi, Schoenbach, Schooler, and Slomczynski 1990; Inglehart and Baker 2000).  
Although giving priority to structure (scarcity/affluence) over culture (survival/self-
expression) can be considered a matter of theoretical preference, in this case it is mostly 
an empirically driven decision. 
First, this scale has always been calculated including an indicator of happiness 
that I must drop given that the outcome is life satisfaction.  Second, when I included the 
scale (excluding happiness) in the same model with GDP per capita I created substantial 
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problems of multicollinearity.  As can be expected, survival values and GDP per capita 
have a strong statistically significant inverse correlation of r = -.82 (p<.001).  (Appendix 
Figure A1 illustrates the bivariate relationship between survival values and the 
logarithmic transformation of GDP per capita).  The shift from survival to self-expression 
values is largely explained by the unprecedented wealth that many societies have 
accumulated during the last century, which resulted in an increasing proportion of recent 
cohorts taking survival for granted and shifting priorities from an emphasis on economic 
and physical security toward an increasing emphasis on subjective well-being and self-
realization (Inglehart 2008).   
Given these primarily empirical constraints, I propose a model that characterizes 
the context in which pension policy is embedded according to two dimensions: (1) 
cultural values ranging from traditional to secular-rational, and (2) structural economic 
conditions ranging from scarcity to affluence.  In this study, I neither test competing 
theoretical arguments about the primacy of structure or culture, nor include other 
structural variables, such as income inequality.  I start with a broad characterization of the 
cultural and economic context in which pension policies operate and leave these areas for 
future development of this research. 
The main effect of traditional cultural values on life satisfaction is unclear from 
previous research, but the effect of economic prosperity today is widely agreed to be 
positive (Stevenson and Wolfers 2008; Veenhoven 2009).  But how do culture and 
structure moderate the effect of pension policy on life satisfaction? 
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I argue that when pension policies are in conflict with the cultural and structural 
context, they tend to dampen life satisfaction and to arouse negative emotions.  
Conversely, tight coupling between pension policy and the cultural and structural context 
will increase life satisfaction and generate positive emotions. Henceforth I refer to these 
expected relationships as the policy/context congruence (or discrepancy) theory.   
Table 2 illustrates the interaction between the two dimensions of pension policy 
identified in the previous section—individualization and redistribution—and the cultural 
and economic context in which pension policy is embedded.  Although there are four 
possible interactions and eight possible types of effects, I only have strong theoretical 
reasons to argue for two situations in which the effect of pension policy may significantly 
vary across cultural (cell 2) and structural-economic context (cell 3).   
 
Table 2. Interaction Between Pension Policy and the Cultural-Economic Context 
  Individualization Redistribution 
Culture (1) (2) Policy-culture 
Economy (3) Policy-economy (4) 
 
 
In the previous section I argued that the redistribution component of pension 
policy is likely to have a beneficial effect on life satisfaction.  Drawing from the 
congruence/discrepancy theory outlined above, I expect the beneficial effect of 
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redistribution to be stronger for traditional than for secular-rational cultures (cell 2).  
First, redistribution involves non-contributory pensions typically provided and funded by 
the state, and traditional cultures are more inclined to rely on this type of institution than 
secular-rational cultures, which tend to shift away from traditional institutions (including 
the state, family, and church).  Second, previous research suggests that, compared to 
secular-rational cultures, traditional cultures are more likely to place God, nature, or the 
collectivity rather than individual labor as the ultimate origin of wealth (e.g., Bataille 
1998; Cousiño 1990; Cousiño and Valenzuela 1994; Mauss 1967; Morandé 1984).  This, 
in turn, makes them more prone to engage in rituals of wealth circulation and 
expenditures that are easily extended to the welfare state.  In such context, welfare 
assistance may be experienced as a legitimate transfer to which low-income groups are 
entitled.  In contrast, for people living in secular-rational cultures, redistribution may be 
associated with stigma (Barr 1992; Estes 2001; Quadagno 2005).  Along the same lines, it 
is plausible to argue that traditional cultures have a stronger moral conception about 
social justice that may help beneficiaries (and the collectivity) to frame social assistance 
benefits as an entitlement. Secular-rational cultures have less absolute moral conceptions 
about social justice and are more likely to engage in a discussion about rights and 
conditions of redistribution. 
The congruence/discrepancy theory also suggests that the effect of 
individualization on life satisfaction may show significant variation across economic 
contexts (cell 3).  In the previous section, I argued that holding redistribution constant, 
the effect of individualization on life satisfaction may be negligible, as it brings both 
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choice and risk to the individual.  However, I expect the effects of individualization on 
life satisfaction to be significant and negative for low-income economies and significant 
and positive for high-income societies.  The main reason to expect this outcome is that 
individuals living in a context of scarcity have a structural disadvantage to bear risk.  It 
may be hard to bear the risk of having enough retirement income in the United States, but 
in the poorest countries of the world, older people live in absolute and complete poverty 
and thus have almost no capacity to bear this risk on their own.  Individuals living in low-
income countries face greater risks and will therefore obtain more benefits from 
socialization as opposed to individualization of risk.  In contrast, an affluent economy 
may operate as a shield that protects individuals from increased risk and enables them to 
enjoy their choices and to obtain more returns on their investments.  For example, it is 
easier to make and delegate investment decisions in wealthier societies, where the 
government has more resources to improve the default options in the system and promote 
financial literacy, and individuals have more resources and opportunities to seek expert 
support and have more confidence on the state to insure against market risks in situations 
of crisis (Botty and Iyengar 2006; Dion and Roberts 2009). 
The two empty cells in Table 2 indicate interactions that have weaker theoretical 
grounds.  There is no strong reason to expect the effects of individualization to vary 
significantly across cultures (cell 1).  It is not clear how the experience of the balance of 
risk, choice, and return will change from a traditional to a secular-rational culture.  An 
interaction between redistribution and the economic context is also unclear (cell 4).  It 
may be argued that redistribution has less impact on life satisfaction in affluent societies 
 31
where the overall standard of living is higher.  However, there are at least two caveats for 
this reasoning.  First, poverty and inequality are hard subjective experiences everywhere 
in the world.  Second, it may be even harder to cope with poverty and inequality for 
individuals living in affluent societies full of opportunities that appear impossible to 
reach.  
Are the policy-culture and policy-economy discrepancies possible?  Because 
policy change is shaped by numerous factors other than culture and economy (Brown 
2005), it is certainly possible for pension policy to develop in conflict with cultural 
values and economic needs.  Policy change is also the result of class struggle and political 
organization (Esping-Andersen 1999; Quadagno 2005; Pampel and Williamson 1989), as 
well as institutional constraints stemming from previously enacted and current policies 
(Immergut 1998; Orloff 1993; Pierson 1994, Skocpol 1992), and ideas (Béland 2005; 
Campbell 2002).  The fact that pension policy is embedded in a culture and economy 
does not mean that policy change is the unavoidable result of the cultural and economic 
context. 
As individualization and redistribution in pension policy interact with cultural 
values and economic prosperity, they may also interact with government generosity in 
providing benefits.  The next section summarizes current knowledge in this area. 
 
2.2.4. Welfare Expenditures on Social Security 
Lay conceptions assume that life is better in countries with higher levels of social 
security.  Yet previous research has found that countries with considerable welfare effort 
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fare slightly better than—or as good as—countries that spend less in social security (Di 
Tella, MacCulloch, and Oswald 2003; Ouweneel 2002; Ouweneel and Veenhoven 1995; 
Pampel and Williamson 1989; Radcliff 2001; Veenhoven 2000).  This body of research is 
very informative and encompasses a broad range of measures of welfare expenditures 
(e.g., expenditures on social security, total welfare expenditures, and others, in constant 
dollars and as a percentage of GDP).   
In order to build cumulative knowledge, in this study I take a different approach 
to explore the relationship between the welfare state and well-being.  Instead of 
emphasizing social security expenditures, my focus is on variations in the type of pension 
policy—more or less individualization and redistribution.  However, I do take welfare 
expenditures into account.  Specifically, I explore if the effects of pension policy vary 
depending on government commitment to social security—expenditures on social 
security as a percentage of total government expenditures—and social security 
generosity—expenditures on social security as a percentage of total government 
expenditures, divided by the number of people age 60 and over.  
Does government commitment to social security affect the relationship between 
the type of pension policy and life satisfaction?  Policy debates show divided opinions 
(Bjørnskov, Dreher, and Fischer 2007).  On the one side, neoclassic theory argues that 
governments have unambiguously beneficial impact on the well-being of their citizens.  
For example, government commitment to social security may buffer the detrimental 
effect of increased risk that individuals bear in highly individualized pension systems.  
On the other side, public choice theory claims that governments have numerous perverse 
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effects that may harm life satisfaction.  For example, poverty prevention and 
redistribution can be taxing to the government.  Therefore, a pension policy strong in the 
redistribution dimension coupled with a government allocating a large fraction of its 
resources to social security may result in overall inefficiency and inability to provide 
other very much needed services.  No empirical research has assessed these possibilities, 
however.    
 
2.3. Research Hypotheses 
Based on these theoretical propositions and literature discussed in this chapter, I 
generate four major hypotheses to test in this study: 
1. Pension policy is a two-dimensional phenomenon (i.e., individualization 
and redistribution are distinct dimensions). 
2. Higher levels of individualization will be associated with lower life 
satisfaction, while higher levels of redistribution will be associated with 
higher life satisfaction. 
3. The effects of pension policy on life satisfaction will be more beneficial 
when policies are congruent to the macro-social context (e.g., 
individualization will have better outcomes in more prosperous economies 
and redistribution will have better outcomes in traditional than in secular 
rational cultures). 
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4. The effects of pension policy on life satisfaction will vary depending on 
government commitment to social security (e.g., individualization and 
redistribution will have better outcomes when the government commits a 
larger fraction of its resources to social security, and when social security 
generosity is higher). 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
This chapter explains the methods used in carrying out the study.  I begin by 
describing the data sources, explaining the multilevel and longitudinal structure of the 
combined dataset, and discussing the sample.  Next, I discuss the operationalization of 
life satisfaction, pension policy, and other variables included in the analysis. In the final 
section of this chapter I explain my analytic strategy. 
 
3.1. Data and Sample 
Numerous individual-level differences in life satisfaction can be observed: For 
example, at a given point in time, older people seem to be more satisfied with their lives 
than younger people; individuals are also more satisfied if they are married, educated, 
employed, and wealthier (Diener, et al. 1999). These effects can be estimated with micro-
level data. However, we need aggregated data to test for the impact of pension policy on 
life satisfaction and examine the factors that may impact this relationship.  In this study, I 
am using both type of data and combine them into a multilevel longitudinal dataset. 
The raw data for this study are drawn from several sources, including a number of 
databases that are publicly available through the internet and reports that provide 
information on the public pension systems in printed format. The most important sources 
of data are: the World Values Survey (2009) database and the Social Security Programs 
throughout the World reports (U.S. Social Security Administration 1981-2008).  
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The World Values Survey includes data collected from representative national 
samples in 97 countries, collecting information on life satisfaction and values for more 
than of 350,000 individuals at five time points since 1981.  Different individuals are 
surveyed over time using face-to-face interviews.  The sampling methodology varies 
from country to country.  The countries surveyed contain about 90 percent of the world’s 
population, covering all major cultural zones and a broad range in terms of income, from 
very poor to very rich.  However, high-income countries tend to have more time points 
than low-income countries.  For the purpose of this study, I restricted the sample to 91 
countries with information available on both life satisfaction and pension policy, and to 
126,560 individuals age 45 and over.  I used this age limit because the mechanisms 
through which pension policy may affect younger individuals’ life satisfaction may be 
entirely different (e.g., intergenerational transfers).  Age 45 was the highest possible cut-
off point that resulted in all the countries having sufficient individual-level observations 
at each time point.  Because some of these individuals are more than 20 years away from 
retirement, this study may underestimate the influence of pension policy on life 
satisfaction. 
The Social Security Programs throughout the World reports provide extremely 
rich information on pension systems, but a large portion of the data available in these 
reports was only available in textual form and not as a usable database for statistical 
processing.  Therefore, an extensive and systematic interpretation and coding was carried 
out over the period of 2007 to 2009 to create a database that would include data 
comparable across countries and over time.  I worked with research assistants and 
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colleagues to code the printed reports and enter the data by hand into an electronic 
database.  Each data entry was verified by two independent coders.  Coding criteria were 
validated by a third party.  When pension policy data for a specific country was 
inexistent, incomplete, or ambiguous, we used data from three additional sources: Social 
Security Observatory (International Labour Organization 2009a), Social Security 
Statistics (International Labour Organization 2009b), and Social Security Worldwide 
(International Social Security Association 2009). 
I also pulled data on gross domestic product from the World Development 
Indicators (World Bank 2009) and data on government expenditures from UNdata 
(United Nations 2009).  I combined all data sources using a previously created dataset 
including country names and identification variables as used in each data source, as well 
as a newly created unique identification variable for each country and year of 
observation.  I followed the conventional recommendations formulated in previous 
literature on cross-national data use and harmonization (e.g., Burkhauser and Lillard 
2005; Inglehart and Welzel 2004).  Three issues in cleaning, harmonizing, and combining 
the data sources deserve some discussion.   
First, a few societies merged (e.g., Democratic Republic of Germany and Federal 
Republic of Germany), split up (e.g., Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and 
Yugoslavia), or had a special administrative relationship (e.g., China and Hong Kong) 
during the period covered in this study.  I kept these countries separated (e.g., Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, and other countries of the former Soviet Union) unless this would have 
introduced a serious violation to the independence of observations assumption (e.g., 
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because Democratic Republic of Germany and Federal Republic of Germany merged in 
the second out of five time points in which they were observed, I recoded data only for 
the unified country—Germany—and gave priority to the pension system that largely 
remained in place—Federal Republic of Germany).   
A second issue in combining the data sources is the treatment of unequal time 
points.  Because the Social Security Programs throughout the World reports are typically 
published every other year (e.g., 1995 and 1997), when the World Values Survey data for 
a given country falls in between reports (e.g., 1996), information on pension policy is 
taken from the following report (e.g., 1997) and corrected if changes occurred after the 
World Values Survey year (e.g., individual retirement accounts introduced in 1997 are not 
recorded for a country that collected World Values Survey data in 1996).  
A third issue in creating the combined dataset is that UNdata on national accounts 
were compiled according to different methodologies.  Therefore, I first make the time 
series comparable.  Take the case of a country that has two different series, an old series 
covering the years from 1980 to 1990, and a second one that covers the years 1989 to 
2008 using more sophisticated accounting methods.  The values for the two overlapping 
years can look substantially different.  However, the rate of change from 1989 to 1990 is 
typically similar.  I know that the second series is a better estimation of the true absolute 
value for 1989. Therefore, I start by taking the value of the second series (i.e., most 
updated accounting method) for 1989 as the reference year to derive earlier yeas.  Next, I 
calculate the rate of change for every year in the first series.  Using the rate of change of 
the first series for the period between 1988 and 1989, I derive the value that the first 
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series would assign to the year 1988.  I repeat the procedure for the previous years.  I take 
the last available year in the past for the highest (i.e., most updated accounting method) 
as a reference year, calculate the rate of growth for the next lower series, and apply this 
rate to the first available year of the most recent series version to derive backward values 
of previous years.   
The resulting database has a multilevel scope and longitudinal dimension.  Figure 
1 illustrates the nested structure of these data and the sample size at each level.  Level 1 
includes observations for 126,560 individuals over time.  Because these are not the same 
individuals over time (i.e., repeated cross-sections), level 1 data capture variation 
between individuals.  Individuals are clustered within 234 country-year observations at 
level 2.  Because these are the same countries observed over time, level 2 captures within 
country variation.  Country-years are clustered within 91 countries at level 3.  At this 
level, the data capture between country variation.   
An alternative way to conceptualize the difference between levels is to think 
about level 1 as personal characteristics of the respondent, level 2 as time variant or 
dynamic characteristics of countries, and level 3 as time invariant or static characteristics 
of countries.   
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Figure 1. Nested Structure of the Data 
 
 
Appendix Table A1 provides information on the mean and total individual-level 
sample size for every country by time point.  At the country-level, the data have an 
unbalanced panel structure (i.e., countries are observed at different time points) with a 
few countries observed a single time and most countries observed at multiple times.  The 
hierarchical linear model used in this study allows for the use of data available at several 
uneven time points and takes advantage of the full information available.  After the next 
section, describing the variables used in the analysis, I dedicate a section to explaining 
hierarchical linear models and the general analytic strategy used in this study more in 
detail. 
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3.2. Variables 
 
3.2.1. Life Satisfaction 
Life satisfaction is defined as an enduring subjective enjoyment of life as a whole 
and measured with a single question in the World Values Survey (2009) posed to every 
respondent: “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these 
days?”  Answers are on a scale ranging from 0 to 10 (0 meaning “dissatisfied” and 10 
“satisfied”).  Despite the simplicity of this measure and a number of measurement issues 
(e.g., positioning of the question in the survey), there is considerable evidence of its 
adequacy.  In fact, life satisfaction is a core variable in surveys about quality of life, and 
has been used in numerous nations for the last four decades (Veenhoven 2009).  A large 
literature assesses the validity and reliability of self-reported measures of subjective well-
being in general and life satisfaction in particular (e.g., Bradburn and Noll 1969; Diener 
at al. 1999; Frey and Sutzer 2002; George 2006).  Appendix Table A2 summarizes 
national life satisfaction averages at each time point.  The distribution is consistent to 
what has been reported in previous research including other age groups in the sample 
(e.g., Inglehart and Klingemann 2000). 
 
3.2.2. Individualization and Redistribution in Pension Policy 
To measure old-age public pension policy type, I use six dichotomous measures 
drawn primarily from the Social Security Programs throughout the World reports (U.S. 
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Social Security Administration 1979-2008). This includes: (1) presence of individual 
retirement accounts; (2) closure or phasing out of the social insurance system (as pointed 
out by Mesa-Lago 2004, closure or phasing out takes place when countries introduce 
individual retirement accounts as a replacement of the previous social insurance system 
rather than as an alternative or complement); (3) insured person contributes more than a 
third of total contributions; (4) presence of means-tested or universal pensions (because a 
small number of countries have universal pension, this variable indicates either means-
tested or universal); (5) government covers the whole cost of non-contributory pensions; 
and (6) government systematically subsidizes the system regardless of deficits.  I 
hypothesize that the first three variables are indicators for individualization of pension 
policy (i.e., low pooling of risk), while the last three indicate a different dimension of 
pension policy that relates to income redistribution and poverty prevention.  To evaluate 
the presence of these two dimensions, I use principal component factor analysis, a 
statistical technique that extracts as much common variance as possible from a set of 
indicators through the successive creation of components or factors.  In addition to the 
theoretical interest of this analysis, using factor scales prevents potential problems of 
multicollinearity that will result from including all six variables in the same model, as 
they are moderately to strongly correlated.  Appendix Table A3 reports the tetrachoric 
correlations among the six dichotomies, adjusting the frequencies for cells that have a 
zero count, and modifying the matrix to be positive (semi)definite.  High correlations in 
the upper left and the bottom right of the matrix suggest that these variables tend to group 
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together in the two theorized dimensions.  I discuss the findings of the principal 
component factor analysis in the Results chapter. 
 
3.2.3. Traditional Versus Secular-Rational Culture 
Traditional versus secular-rational culture variable is a weighted scale designed to 
have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1, and ranging from -1.94 to 1.82.  I 
calculated the scale using principal component factor analysis on the following eight 
items included in the World Values Survey (2009): (1) God is important in respondent’s 
life (1 = “not at all important” and 10 = “very important”); (2) frequency of church 
attendance (in days per year); (3) respondent has confidence in the country's churches (1= 
“quite a lot to great deal” and 0 = “none at all to not very much”); (4) it is more important 
for a child to learn obedience and religious faith than independence and determination (1 
= yes, and 0 = no); (5) respondent favors more respect for authority (1 meaning that 
“greater respect for authority is a good thing”, and 0 meaning “bad thing” or “don’t 
mind”); (6) respondent has strong sense of national pride (1 meaning “not proud at all 
proud”, 2 “not very proud”, 3 “quite proud”, and 4 “very proud”); (7) abortion is never 
justifiable (1 meaning “always justifiable” and 10 “never justifiable”); (8) euthanasia is 
never justifiable (1 meaning “always justifiable”, and 10 “never justifiable”).  I choose 
these indicators based on previous work by Inglehart and his colleagues (Inglehart 2008, 
2003; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart and Klingemann 2000; Inglehart and Welzel 
2005).   
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I calculate the country average and then standardize each indicator to adjust for 
different distributions.  Appendix Table A4 reports the correlations between these eight 
indicators.  Principal component factor analysis is a useful technique to reduce this large 
number of variables to a single scale.  Table 3 summarizes the results of this analysis.  
The coefficients used to calculate the scores are presented in the first column. The second 
and third columns provide information on the item-rest correlations and the unexplained 
item variance.  The numbers obtained suggest homogeneity and high percentage of 
variance explained for each indicator.  The resulting scale explained 74 percent of the 
variance in the eight items included in the calculation and has a very high reliability 
coefficient (alpha=.95).  Countries scoring high on this scale emphasize religion and 
deference to authority, show high levels of national pride, and reject abortion and 
euthanasia. Countries scoring low in this scale emphasize secular autonomy and self-
determination, and have less absolute standards regarding abortion and euthanasia.  
Overall, these loadings correspond to those identified in previous research. 
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Table 3. Loadings, Variance, and Reliability of the Traditional Versus 
Secular-Rational Culture Scale 
Item Loading
Item-rest 
Corr. 
Unexplained 
Item Variance
God is very important in respondent's 
life .94 .91 .12 
Respondent attends church regularly 
in a calendar year .85 .79 .29 
Respondent has quite a lot to a great 
deal of confidence in the country's 
churches 
.86 .82 .26 
It is more important for a child to 
learn obedience and religious faith 
than independence and determination 
.89 .85 .21 
Respondent favors more respect for 
authority .73 .66 .46 
Respondent has strong sense of 
national pride .78 .73 .38 
Abortion is never justifiable .89 .86 .20 
Euthanasia is never justifiable .91 .88 .17 
Total Variance Explained (Rho) = .74 
Cronbach’s Alpha Reliability Coefficient = .95 
Notes: Loadings calculated using principal component factor analysis. Items were averaged at 
the country-level and standardized before the analysis. 
 
 
3.2.4. Affluent Economic Structure 
Economic prosperity is measured drawing data from the World Development 
Indicators database (World Bank 2009) on GDP per capita in thousands of constant (year 
2000) United States dollars. The raw variable ranged from $200 to $40,000.  However, 
this variable was logarithmically transformed and top-coded at the equivalent of $40,000.  
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3.2.5. Government Expenditure on Social Security 
Government expenditure on social security is measured using UNdata (United 
Nations 2009) information on government final consumption expenditure by function at 
current prices.  Specifically, I create two measures: government commitment to social 
security and social security generosity.  Government commitment to social security is 
government final consumption expenditure on social security as a percentage of 
government total final consumption.  Social security generosity is government final 
consumption expenditure on social security as a percentage of GDP, divided by the 
number of people age 60 and over.  The latter can be considered an age adjusted measure 
of generosity. 
Because national accounts data were compiled according to different 
methodologies, I first make the time series comparable, as explained in the Data section 
at the beginning of this chapter.  After making the series compatible, I calculate both 
government commitment to social security and social security generosity.  I used a 
logarithmic transformation of government commitment to social security and top-coded 
this variable at the equivalent of 50 percent. 
 
3.2.6. Control Variables 
In order to identify the effect of pension policy on life satisfaction, and the 
contexts that strengthen or weaken this effect, I control for a number of personal 
characteristics of the respondent that may be affecting life satisfaction.  Gender is a 
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dichotomy coded 1 for men and 0 for women.  Age is measured in years and top-coded at 
105.  (Top-coding age lower, at 100, created problems of non-normal distribution for this 
variable.)  Marital status is measured using two dichotomies indicating (1) divorced, 
separated, or widowed, and (2) never married, the omitted category being married or 
partnered.  Education consists of three dichotomies: (1) primary completed but less than 
high school, (2) high school, and (3) more than high school, the mitted category being no 
education or incomplete primary school.  Employment is measured using two 
dichotomies indicating (1) retired and (2) not working other than retired (e.g., 
unemployed, students, and homemakers), the omitted category being working.  Income is 
a scale ranging from 1 (“lowest decile”) to 10 (“highest decile”).  I draw data for all these 
control variables from the World Values Survey database.   
At level 2, where I have repeated observations of the same countries across time, I 
include a time control variable, measured in years, ranging from 1981 to 2008.  I include 
this variable in the model divided by five (so that one unit is five years) to obtain 
coefficients of a reasonable magnitude.  In addition to age, income, and time, I include a 
squared term of each of these variables to test for curvilinear effects.  Graphical 
exploration of bivariate relationships in the data suggested a slightly quadratic age and 
income effects and a clear quadratic time effect.  The quadratic term for age was not 
significant and I dropped it from the model.   
I tried additional control variables at the three levels, but dropped them from the 
models for a number of reasons.  Because pension income can be complemented by 
informal family support, I tried measures of coresidence and number of children, but they 
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did not have significant effects and did not change the results.  I tried measures of 
government expenditures on health and country-level demographics to control for other 
characteristics of welfare states that may influence life satisfaction and country 
characteristics that may moderate the relationship between pension policy and life 
satisfaction, but dropped them because they introduced severe problems of non-
normality, multicollinearity, and heterocedasticity that could not be remedied.  I also tried 
measures of balance of payments and external debt, as they may be considered a rough 
proxy for the solvency of public pension systems and the trust people have on their 
continuity.  However, the validity of these proxies is arguable and including them 
substantially increased the number of missing values, making imputation a controversial 
solution at least for these specific variables.  Finally, controlling for country-level 
composition in terms of the respondents characteristics would have resulted in little 
power of analysis given the limited number of countries.   
Table 4 summarizes the measures used in this study, the corresponding sources of 
information, and the levels on which they are included in the analysis.  In the next section 
I explain my analytical strategy and justify why cultural values, economic affluence, 
government commitment to social security, and social security generosity are included as 
enduring (level 3) rather than dynamic (level 2) country characteristics. 
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Table 4. Measures and Sources at Each Level 
Measure Source 
Individual Characteristics (Level 1) 
 Life Satisfaction WVS 
 Male WVS 
 Age WVS 
 Married WVS 
 Divorced, Separated, or Widowed WVS 
 Never Married WVS 
 No Education or less than Primary School WVS 
 Primary Completed but less than High School WVS 
 High School WVS 
 More Than High School WVS 
 Working WVS 
 Retired WVS 
 Not Working Other Than Retired WVS 
 Income Decile WVS 
Dynamic Country Characteristics (Level 2) 
 Individual Retirement Accounts SSPTW, SSO, SSS, and SSW 
 Social Insurance System Closed SSPTW, SSO, SSS, and SSW 
 Insured Contributions > Third of Total SSPTW, SSO, SSS, and SSW 
 Non-contributory Pensions SSPTW, SSO, SSS, and SSW 
 Government Funds Non-cont. Pensions SSPTW, SSO, SSS, and SSW 
 Government Subsidizes System SSPTW, SSO, SSS, and SSW 
 Time WVS 
Enduring Country Characteristics (Level 3) 
 Traditional Values WVS 
 GDP Per Capita (U.S. $1000) WDI 
  Government Commitment to Social Security UND 
  Social Security Generosity UND 
Notes: WVS = World Values Survey; SSPTW = Social Security Programs throughout the World; SSO = 
Social Security Observatory; SSS = Social Security Statistics; SSW = Social Security Worldwide; WDI = 
World Development Indicators; UND = UNdata. 
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3.3. Analytic Strategy 
I start by exploring the dimensionality of pension policy using principal 
component factor analysis.  This technique is helpful to uncover the underlying structure 
(dimensions) of the indicators I use to characterize the type of pension policy and to 
reduce these six variables into a smaller number of scales.  After confirming that pension 
policy has two dimensions, I create two scales: individualization and redistribution.  I 
calculate the scales using oblique oblimin rotation.  This rotation method does not 
constrain the scales to be uncorrelated, which is a strong theoretical assumption in the 
case of individualization and redistribution.  Next, I proceed to analyze the effect of both 
individualization and redistribution on life satisfaction, as well as the factors moderating 
this relationship. 
I handle the nested structure of the data (i.e., individual observations clustered 
within country observations for each time point, then clustered within countries; see 
Figure 1) using three-level hierarchical linear modeling technique, also known as 
longitudinal multilevel modeling or mixed (fixed and random) effects modeling 
(Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).  In very simple terms, hierarchical linear modeling is “a 
statistical technique applied to data collected at more than one level in order to elucidate 
relationships at more than one level” (Luke 2004:7-8).    
Hierarchical (i.e., nested or multilevel) data structures are very common in the 
social sciences.  For example, citizens are grouped in countries, workers in firms, 
residents in neighborhoods, companies in states, and individuals in households.  Perhaps 
the leading example of hierarchical data comes from the field of education because 
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students are grouped in classes, classes in schools, schools in districts, and so on 
(Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).  Similarly, when countries are observed over time, then the 
repeated measurements for a specific country are grouped in countries. For example, in 
this study Japan is a level 3 unit that was observed in the years 1981, 1990, 1995, 2000, 
and 2005 (see Appendix Table A1).  These repeated measures over time are lower level 
units (level 2).  The individuals surveyed in each country at a specific time point are the 
lowest-level unit (level 1) in this study. 
One of the main methodological challenges in this study is to relate properties of 
individuals and properties of countries over time.  Disaggregating country-level variables 
to the individual-level (e.g., assigning pension policy type to the respondents) and using 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression will violate the assumption of independence of 
observations and uncorrelated errors.  Specifically, the problem is that all individuals that 
live in the same country will have the same values on the country-level variables.  For 
example, individuals living in the same country will have the same values for pension 
policy individualization.  They will also share unobserved country-level characteristics, 
for example, simplicity/difficulty in the pension system rules.  Because there are no 
available measures to control for these unobserved variables, they will become part of the 
error term in an OLS regression, causing correlation between these disturbances.  
Aggregating individual-level variables to the country-level and doing the OLS analysis at 
the country-level will result in the loss of information.  Because most of the variation in 
life satisfaction happens between individuals (i.e., within countries), doing the analysis at 
the country level will likely result in an overestimation of the relationship between 
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aggregated variables.  Therefore, using OLS regressions with aggregated and 
disaggregated data will yield biased results (Luke 2004).  Using alternative methods (e.g., 
analysis of variance or covariance) to adjust for the grouping of individuals is still 
problematic.  First, it is not possible to include a dummy variable for each country and at 
the same time include country-level variables.  Second, including a dummy variable for 
each country will substantially reduce power of analysis and parsimony.  Third, these 
country-effects will be considered as fixed, ignoring that they may randomly vary 
depending on other country-level characteristics.  Finally, OLS regressions and other 
alternative methods to hierarchical linear modeling are not flexible in handling data 
available at several uneven time points, as is the case in this study (see Appendix Table 
A1).  Hierarchical linear modeling resolves all these problems. 
Using hierarchical linear modeling techniques is particularly helpful for this study 
for a number of reasons.  First, they can reveal social processes by which individuals’ life 
satisfaction is shaped by their social context.  Hierarchical linear modeling can do this 
through the simultaneous analysis of individual-level data in the form of repeated cross-
section sample surveys (such as the World Values Survey) and cross-national data.  
Second, this technique allows for the use of unbalanced panel data (i.e., data available at 
several uneven time periods).  As illustrated in Appendix Table A1, countries included in 
this study were observed at different years from 1981 to 2008.  Third, hierarchical linear 
modeling allows use of repeated observations which increases the degrees of freedom and 
this is crucial in cross-national analysis because the number of countries is limited.  
Repeated observations over time increase the power of statistical tests and allow for the 
 53
inclusion of a larger number of variables into the models.  Finally, hierarchical linear 
modeling allows for estimates of within country effects (e.g., the impact of pension 
policy on life satisfaction) and cross-level interactions (e.g., variations in the impact of 
pension policy on life satisfaction across cultural and economic context), controlling for 
both individual-level characteristics and unobserved country characteristics.   
As illustrated in the bottom rows of Table 4, I include a number of time-invariant 
variables (level 3) in the analysis.  I include cultural values and economic structure as 
time-invariant (level 3) predictors because I am interested in explaining between country 
variations in the effect of pension policy on life satisfaction (i.e., cross-level 
pension/context interactions).  Although it may sound controversial to treat culture and 
economy as enduring country characteristics, both variables show great stability for the 
countries and years observed in these data.  Specifically, about 95 percent of the variance 
in cultural values is between countries and only 5 percent within countries (i.e., across 
time).  For GDP, 93 percent of the variance is between countries and 7 percent within 
countries.  In contrast, for pension policy about 62 percent of the variance is between 
countries and 38 percent is dynamic.  These numbers suggests that—at least in this 
dataset—policy changes are embedded in cultural and economic contexts that change at a 
much slower rate.  Finally, I include government commitment to social security and 
social security generosity as time-invariant variables (level 3) because otherwise the 
number of missing observations would have increased substantially.  Figure 1 illustrates 
that only a country average is needed at level 3, while multiple time points are needed for 
each country at level 2.   
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To help clarify my analytic strategy, the following equations display the 
relationships that I included in the final model at each level: 
 
Level 1: LSATijk =  π0jk + ∑π1jk*RESPijk + eijk (1)
Level 2: π0jk = β00k + β01k*INDjk + β02k*REDjk + β03k*INDjk*REDjk + β04k*TIMEjk 
  + β05k*SQTIMEjk + r0jk 
(2)
 π1jk = β10k (3)
Level 3: β00k = γ000 + γ001*TRADk + γ002*GDPk + γ003*GOVk + γ004*GENk + u00k (4)
 β01k = γ010 + γ011*GDPk + γ012GOVk (5)
 β02k = γ020 + γ021*TRADk (6)
 β03k = γ030 (7)
 β04k = γ040 (8)
 β05k = γ050 + u05k (9)
 β10k = γ100 (10)
 
This set of equations clearly illustrates the multilevel nature of the model.  Here, 
the subscripts i, j, and k denote individuals, country-year observations, and countries, 
respectively.  In Equation 1, LSATijk is the life satisfaction of individual i in year j and 
country k;  π0jk is the average life satisfaction in year j and country k;  RESPijk is a vector 
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of individual characteristics of the respondent that predict life satisfaction (including 
gender, age, marital status, education, employment status, income decile, and squared 
income decile) and π1jk is the corresponding vector of regression coefficients;  and eijk is 
the residual effect for individual i in year j and country k.  Although this level 1 equation 
resembles an OLS regression, the subscripts are indicating an important difference:  
Hierarchical linear modeling estimates a different level 1 model for each year j and 
country k.  Specifically, average life satisfaction (level 1 intercept π0jk) is allowed to be 
different in each year j (π0jk in Equation 2) and country k (β00k in Equation 4).   
The multilevel nature of this model becomes evident in Equations 2 and 3, where 
I treat the level 1 intercept (π0jk) as outcome of level 2 predictors and variability.  I treat 
level 1 slopes as fixed because I am only interested in controlling for these effects, but 
not in identifying cross-level interactions with individual-level variables that will result in 
decreased power of analysis and parsimony.  In Equation 2, β00k is average life 
satisfaction in country k, controlling for level 2 predictors;  β01k and β02k are the effects 
(slopes) of pension policy individualization (INDjk) and redistribution (REDjk) in year j 
and country k;  β03k is the interaction between individualization and redistribution in year 
j and country k;  β04k and β05k indicate the linear (TIMEjk) and quadratic (SQTIMEjk) 
effect of time in year j and country k;  and r0jk is a random coefficient indicating the error 
or unexplained variance for year j in country k.  This random coefficient captures 
unmodeled within country (level 2) variance in life satisfaction.   
In Equation 3, β10k is the average within country effect of respondent 
characteristics.  I do not include random coefficients for these characteristics because in 
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this study I am only interested in controlling for individual-level characteristics and not in 
understanding if these effects vary across countries over time.  Furthermore, including 
random effects for gender, age, and the other nine level 1 variables included in the model 
will reduce power of analysis and parsimony at higher levels.  
In Equations 4 to 10, I treat the level 2 intercepts (β00k and β10k) and slopes (β01k, 
β02k, β03k, and β04k) as outcomes of level 3 predictors and variability.  The first γ 
coefficient in each equation is an intercept:  γ000 is the adjusted grand mean of life 
satisfaction (Equation 4);  γ010 is the adjusted average effect of individualization across 
countries (Equation 5);  γ020 is the adjusted average effect of redistribution across 
countries (Equation 6) ;  γ030 is the average interaction between individualization and 
redistribution (Equation 7);  γ040 is the average linear time trend across countries 
(Equation 8);  γ050 is the average quadratic time trend across countries (Equation 9);  and 
γ100 is the average effect of respondent characteristics across countries (Equation 10).  
Equations 4 to 6 also include slopes (γ after the intercept), but they represent different 
types of effects.  In Equation 4, TRADk is the average score in the traditional versus 
secular culture scale of country k;  GDPk is the average GDP per capita (in year 2000 
constant U.S. dollars) of country k;  GOVk is the average government commitment to 
social security of country k;  GENk is the average social security generosity of country k;    
and γ001, γ002, γ003, and γ004 indicate the main effect of these level 3 variables on life 
satisfaction.  In Equations 5 and 6, the slopes (γ after the intercept) indicate cross-level 
interactions rather than main effects on life satisfaction.  For example, in Equation 5, γ011 
and γ012 indicate that the level 2 effect of individualization (β01k) on life satisfaction can 
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vary depending on the country-level context (level 3).  In other words, the effects of 
individualization can be exacerbated or lowered by economic prosperity (GDPk) and 
government commitment to social security (GOVk).  The interpretation of the other cross-
level interaction terms (γ021) is similar, but in this case the main level 2 effect is 
redistribution (REDjk) and the level 3 moderator is traditional cultural values (TRADk).  I 
tested for other potential cross-level interactions between pension policy and level 3 
variables, but none of them were significant and I dropped them from the model.  
Including u00k in Equation 4, and u05k in Equation 9, means that life satisfaction and the 
quadratic time trend are estimated as random.  That is, the average life satisfaction and 
the quadratic time trend vary across countries (i.e., are country specific).  I included 
random effects in all other level 3 equations, but none of them was significant. 
In sum, Equations 1 to 10 clearly illustrate that there are three levels in the model.  
Level 1 predictors include 11 characteristics of the respondent (RESPijk).  Level 2 
predictors include two pension policy variables (INDjk and REDjk), and interaction term 
between them, and control variables for time (TIMEjk) and squared time (SQTIMEjk).  
Level 3 predictors include four main effects of country stable characteristics—traditional 
versus rational secular values (TRADk), GDP per capita (GDPk), government 
commitment to social security (GOVk), and social security generosity (GENk)—and three 
cross-level interactions between these characteristics and the effects of pension policy at 
level 2.  Equations 1 to 10 also illustrate that unexplained variance is divided into 
different components (u00k and u05k at level 3, r0jk at level 2, and eijk at level 1), allowing 
correct estimates of standard errors at each level.  
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Instead of using a set of ten equations, I can substitute the level 3 parts of the 
model into the level 2 equations, and then into the level 1 equations.  The combined 
mixed equation for the three-level hierarchical linear model looks as follows: 
 
LSATijk =  γ000 + ∑γ100*RESPijk + γ010*INDjk + γ020*REDjk + γ030*INDjk*REDjk + 
γ040*TIMEjk + γ050*SQTIMEjk + γ001*TRADk + γ002*GDPk + γ003*GOVk 
+ γ004*GENk + γ011*INDjk*GDPk + γ012*INDjk*GOVk + 
γ021*REDjk*TRADk + eijk + r0jk + u00k + u05k*SQTIMEk 
(11)
 
where the subscripts i, j, and k denote individuals, country-year observations, and 
countries;  LSATijk is the life satisfaction of individual i in year j and country k;  γ000 is 
the adjusted grand mean of life satisfaction; other γ are the coefficients that indicate the 
direction and strength of association between independent variables and life satisfaction.   
Visually, it is easier to identify cross-level interactions in Equation 11 than in previous 
equations.  For example, the last line in the formula starts with the coefficient γ022 
indicating the strength and direction of the interaction between redistribution in year j and 
country k (REDjk) and traditional cultural values of country k (TRADk).  Equation 11 is 
also useful to separate fixed effects (γ) and the four random effects at the end of the 
equation:  a random individual effect indicating the deviation of individual ijk’s life 
satisfaction from the country-year mean (eijk);  random country-year effect indicating the 
deviation of country-year jk’s mean life satisfaction from the country mean (r0jk);  a 
random country effect indicating the deviation of country k’s mean life satisfaction from 
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the grand mean (u00k); and a random country effect for the quadratic time trend (u05k), that 
is, a random effect indicating the deviation of country k’s quadratic effect of time from 
the mean effect. 
In this study, if continuous variables do not have a meaningful zero, I center them 
around the grand mean of all countries in order to obtain an interpretable intercept in the 
hierarchical linear model.  Because hierarchical linear modeling calculates the intercept 
and variations around the intercept holding independent variables at zero, when zero is 
not meaningful the estimate for the intercept is arbitrary and unreliable.  At level 1, I also 
grand-mean center dichotomous variable because I am not interesting in making 
comparisons, but in adjusting the intercept for individual characteristics. 
I handle missing data problems using a two-stage single stochastic imputation for 
less than 5 percent of the observations that had missing data.  A single stochastic 
imputation has clear advantages compared to a single deterministic imputation, as it 
reduces underestimation of standard errors and prevents inflated correlations between 
variables by including a random component (Allison 2002).  Although a multiple 
imputation by chained equations (MICE) introduce more rigorous adjustments to 
standard errors, as each model is estimated over multiple (at least 5, but ideally 20 or 
more) imputed datasets, the large number of individual-level observations slows down 
the process to an average of one imputed dataset per two days (Royston 2004).  Because 
of the slow imputation speed I used single rather than multiple imputation. 
Given that the World Values Survey dataset has missing values, I first imputed 
these missing values in the individual-level variables.  To calculate cultural values scale 
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using full information and obtain more precise imputed values, I used information 
available for the entire sample and not only for individuals aged 45 and over.  Using the 
imputed individual-level variables, I then calculated the country-level averages of all 
indicators included in the traditional versus secular-rational values scale.  Next, I 
restricted the sample to individuals aged 45 and over and dropped imputed values of the 
dependent variable from the database.  At the second imputation stage, I performed the 
imputation for the country-level variables.  After calculating the cultural values scale, I 
included all country-level variables incorporated in the analysis and supplementary 
variables, such as other characteristics of pension systems, government expenditures on 
health and education, aggregated demographics, and energy use, to assist the imputation. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
This chapter presents the results of the study.  The first section summarizes 
descriptive statistics.  The next section presents the results of the principal component 
factor analysis used to empirically evaluate the theoretical argument about the two 
dimensions—individualization and redistribution—underlying pension policy variation.  
The final section discusses results of the three-level hierarchical linear modeling of the 
influence of pension policy individualization and redistribution on life satisfaction. 
 
4.1. Descriptive Results 
Table 6 reports descriptive statistics for the individual characteristics, dynamic 
country characteristics, and enduring country characteristics.  Average life satisfaction is 
relatively high.  The sample of individuals is evenly distributed across gender, with 
slightly more females, has an average age of 59, and the most common characteristics are 
being married, educated, working and receiving average income.  At level 2, the most 
frequent characteristic of pension policy is a government subsidizing the system 
regardless of deficits, followed by the presence of non-contributory pensions, and then by 
an indicator of government funded non-contributory pensions.  Individual retirement 
accounts have been introduced in numerous countries, but only a few have closed or 
starting to phase out the social insurance system, and a little more require the insured 
person to pay for more than a third of total contributions. The average time point is the 
year 1997.  At level 3, the cultural values scale has a mean around zero (by design, as it 
 62
was created as a factor score), average GDP per capita is $8,630 dollars, and the average 
government expenditures on social security as a percentage of total expenditures is about 
10 percent. The average age adjusted measure of government generosity is .05. 
 
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean SD Min. Max. 
Individual Characteristics (Level 1) 
 Life Satisfaction 6.58 2.53 1.00 10.00 
 Male .48 .50 .00 1.00 
 Age 58.67 10.04 45.00 105.00 
 Married .73 .44 .00 1.00 
 Divorced, Separated, or Widowed .22 .42 .00 1.00 
 Never Married .05 .22 .00 1.00 
 No Education or < Primary School .24 .43 .00 1.00 
 Primary Completed but < High School .37 .48 .00 1.00 
 High School  .26 .44 .00 1.00 
 More Than High School .17 .37 .00 1.00 
 Working .44 .50 .00 1.00 
 Retired .34 .47 .00 1.00 
 Not Working Other Than Retired .22 .42 .00 1.00 
 Income Decile 4.39 2.44 1.00 10.00 
Dynamic Country Characteristics (Level 2) 
 Individual Retirement Accounts .12 .330 .00 1.00 
 Social Insurance System Closed .05 .212 .00 1.00 
 Insured Contributions > Third of Total .07 .253 .00 1.00 
 Non-contributory Pensions .44 .498 .00 1.00 
 Government Funds Non-cont. Pensions .32 .466 .00 1.00 
 Government Subsidizes System .67 .471 .00 1.00 
 Time 1997.13 7.14 1981.00 2008.00 
Enduring Country Characteristics (Level 3) 
 Traditional Values .01 1.00 -1.94 1.82 
 GDP Per Capita (U.S. $1000) 8.63 10.00 .20 40.00 
 Government Commitment to Soc. Sec. 10.36 9.35 .00 50.00 
  Social Security Generosity .05 .170 .00 1.50 
Notes: Sample size varies across levels: level 1 = 126,560 individuals; level 2 = 234 country-year 
observations; level 3 = 91 countries. 
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4.2. Two-Dimensional Pension Policy Space 
To determine the underlying dimensionality of pension policy, I used principal 
component factor analysis on six dichotomies: (1) presence of individual retirement 
accounts; (2) closure or phasing out of the social insurance system; (3) insured person 
contributes more than a third of total contributions; (4) presence of means-tested or 
universal pensions; (5) government covers the whole cost of non-contributory pensions; 
and (6) government systematically subsidizes the system regardless of deficits.  The 
results of this analysis suggest that the six indicators tend to group together to form two 
major dimensions, which I call individualization and redistribution.  In this section, I 
discuss the structure, reliability, and conceptual meaning of these scales. 
Appendix Table A3 reports the tetrachoric correlations among the six 
dichotomies, adjusting the frequencies for cells that have a zero count, and modifying the 
matrix to be positive (semi)definite.  Table 6 summarizes the results of the oblique 
oblimin rotated solution and presents (in the first two columns) the factor loadings used 
to identify the dimensions underlying pension policy variation.  The first three 
dichotomies load high on individualization, while the last three load high on 
redistribution.  The high item-rest point-biserial correlations (i.e., higher than .20) 
reported in the third column indicate that the items discriminate between high-scoring 
and low-scoring countries.  The low unexplained item variance for IRAs and GNC 
indicate that only 1 percent of each item variance is unique variance, a result that is not 
unusual when analyzing dichotomous variables.  The Kuder-Richarson (KR-20) 
coefficients, used to compute the reliability for dichotomous variables, suggest that both 
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factors have moderate to high internal consistency (i.e., higher than .60).  
Individualization explains 42 percent and redistribution explains 38 percent of the total 
variance in the six indicators.  Together, these factors accounted for 80 percent of the 
variance in the six items included in the calculation. 
 
Table 6. Loadings and Reliability of the Individualization and Redistribution Scales 
Item 
Loading 
Indiv. 
Loading 
Redist. 
Item-rest 
Corr. 
Unexplained 
Item 
Variance 
Items Loading High on Individualization (KR-20 reliability = .69) 
 Presence of Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) .99 -.06 .76 .01 
 Old Social Insurance System was Closed or is Phasing Out (SICL) .76 .18 .35 .42 
 
Insured Person Contributes More 
than a Third of Total 
Contributions (ITC) 
.92 -.06 .61 .13 
Items Loading High on Redistribution (KR-20 reliability = .71) 
 
Presence of Means-tested or 
Universal Non-contributory 
Pensions (MTUN) 
.29 .76 .47 .38 
 
Government Covers the Whole 
Cost of Non-contributory 
Pensions (GNC) 
-.05 .99 .73 .01 
 
Government Systematically 
Subsidizes the System, 
Regardless of Deficits (GCT) 
-.16 .82 .35 .26 
 Each Scale .42 .38   
 Total (Rho) = .80     
Notes: Loadings calculated using principal component factor analysis and oblique oblimin rotation, based 
on a tetrachoric correlation matrix (see Appendix Table A3). Item-rest point-biserial correlations and 
Kuder-Richarson (KR-20) reliability coefficient reported for each component. 
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These results provide support to my first hypotheses and clearly illustrate that 
pension policy is not one-dimensional in the way that a large fraction of previous 
literature might suggest.  A model that is forced to extract a single dimension from the six 
variables will account for 38 percent points less than this two-dimensional pension policy 
model.  Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the two-dimensional pension 
policy space.  The vertical axis measures individualization of risks.  Policies taking high 
values along this axis are characterized by low levels of risk pooling and high 
contributions from the insured person.  These are private type policies where individuals 
bare the risk and the level of benefits is linked to the returns made by investments in 
IRAs.  Policies taking low values on this axis are characterized by a high socialization or 
pooling of risk. The horizontal axis captures variation in redistribution.  Policies taking 
high values along this axis involve the presence of government funded non-contributory 
pensions.  These are the public type of policies that aim to prevent poverty and 
redistribute income from high-income to low-income groups.  By contrast, policies taking 
low values along this axis provide little or no poverty alleviation and redistribution from 
the rich to the poor.   
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Figure 2. Loadings of the Individualization and Redistribution Scales 
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Based on the results of the principal component analysis, I predicted factor scores 
to create two scales designed to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.  
Individualization ranges from -.50 to 2.81 and redistribution from -1.64 to 1.12.  In the 
next section, I assess the effect of both individualization and redistribution on the life 
satisfaction of older adults. 
 
4.3. Three-level Hierarchical Linear Modeling Results 
In this section, I turn to the analysis of the influence of pension policy 
individualization and redistribution on life satisfaction.  The results of the three-level 
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hierarchical linear model for life satisfaction are reported in Table 7.  In order to estimate 
the effects of individualization and redistribution on older adults’ life satisfaction, I start 
by controlling for personal characteristics of the respondents.  These results are presented 
at the top of the table and show clear patterns in the life satisfaction levels of 126,560 
adults age 45 and over living in 91 countries, over the period 1981-2008.  Holding all 
variables in the model at their mean, average life satisfaction is 6.45.  Males fare slightly 
worse than females, having an average life satisfaction .12 units lower.  One year 
increase in age is linearly associated with .19 unit increase in life satisfaction.  
Individuals who are divorced, separated, or widowed, as well as those who have never 
been married, show considerable lower levels of life satisfaction than the married (-.43 
and -.35 units respectively).  Education is associated with higher levels of life 
satisfaction.  The higher the educational level achieved, the bigger the difference in life 
satisfaction compared to the group with no education or primary education incomplete.  
However, based on the significance level, the difference appears to be more systematic as 
educational attainment increases (p<.01 for primary completed but less than high school, 
and p<.001 for high school).  Retirees and other individuals that are not working fare 
worse than the group of individuals working, but the effects are smaller compared to the 
effects of marital status.  Climbing up the income ladder is associated with increases of 
.18 units in life satisfaction, but the returns are decreasing by .02 as people get closer to 
the top.  
These results are not surprising in light of previous studies and given the large 
sample of individuals included in the analysis; however, they do suggest some new 
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findings. One is that the individual-level effects hold when levels 2 and 3 heterogeneity 
are taken into account.  Another is that average life satisfaction shows significant random 
variation across countries.  The random effect component at level 3 presented in Table 7 
is capturing the effect of unobserved stable characteristics of countries.  Time squared is 
the only variable that has a significant random effect at level 3.  The random effect 
coefficient for this variable suggests that there are country-specific quadratic time trends 
in the data.  This U-shaped relationship was evident in bivariate analysis of the data.   
One of main advantages of hierarchical linear models is that they allow 
identifying within country effects, adjusting for inter-individual differences.  Controlling 
for individual-level characteristics, unobserved characteristics of countries, and country-
specific quadratic time trends, is there evidence for significant effects of pension policy 
on life satisfaction?    
As Table 7 shows, within countries, individualization is not significantly 
associated with life satisfaction.  In contrast, one unit increase in the redistribution scale 
is associated with .14 units increase in life satisfaction.  My second hypothesis is partly 
confirmed by this analysis.  Results also show that there is no significant interaction 
between individualization and redistribution. 
Another important result is that the effects of individualization do not have 
significant random variation across countries beyond what is explained by the cultural 
and economic context as well as governmental commitment to social security.  
Confirming my third hypothesis about the policy/context congruence, I find that the 
effects of pension policy on life satisfaction are significantly moderated by the cultural 
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and structural context (these coefficients are reported under the heading “Cross-level 
Interactions”).  Individualization interacts with the economic or structural context and 
redistribution interacts with the cultural context.  Specifically, individualization that takes 
place in more affluent societies can have a beneficial impact on life satisfaction, while 
individualization unfolding in contexts of material scarcity can have a detrimental impact 
on life satisfaction.  For redistribution, the overall beneficial effects on life satisfaction 
are substantially increased in the context of traditional cultures and decreased in the 
context of secular-rational cultures. 
In partial confirmation of the fourth hypothesis, I find that government 
commitment to social security is another significant moderator of the effect of 
individualization and redistribution on life satisfaction.  Higher government commitment 
to social security substantially improves the life satisfaction outcomes of 
individualization.  However, I found no evidence for an interaction between social 
security generosity and any of the pension policy variables.  Non significant cross-level 
interactions were dropped from the model to increase parsimony and increase power of 
analysis and are not reported in the table. 
Finally, the analysis controls for the main effect of cultural values, economic 
prosperity, government commitment to social security, and social security generosity on 
life satisfaction.  First, I find that individuals living in affluent economies report higher 
levels of life satisfaction, though extra dollars buy less life satisfaction at high levels of 
affluence (i.e., GDP per capita is logarithmically transformed).  This is consistent with 
previous literature, as wealth and subjective well-being are now widely agreed to have a 
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positive and significant relationship, though with marginally decreasing returns 
(Stevenson and Wolfers 2008; Veenhoven 2009).  Second, traditional values have a 
positive influence on life satisfaction.  This main effect of culture on life satisfaction 
should be explored in further research, as there are no obvious reasons to expect such 
relationship.  Third, although it is generally believed that societies with a high level of 
social security also enjoy higher levels of subjective well-being, I find no main effect of 
government commitment or social security generosity on well-being.  Previous research 
has found similar results and addressed this counterintuitive finding arguing that societies 
compensate for the lack of governmental assistance using other means of support such as 
family, friendship, or community (Di Tella, MacCulloch, and Oswald 2003; Ouweneel 
2002; Ouweneel and Veenhoven 1995; Radcliff 2001; Veenhoven 2000). 
Overall, this model explains 59 percent of the variance in life satisfaction between 
countries, 33 percent of the variance within countries, and only 4 percent of the variance 
among individuals.  This is expected, because most of the variance in life satisfaction 
takes place on the level of individuals, but in this model, the focus was on country-level 
variables. 
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Table 7. Three-Level Model of the Pension System Effects on Life Satisfaction 
Fixed Effect Coefficient SE 
Intercept   
 Average Life Satisfaction, γ000 6.45*** .091 
Individual Characteristics (Level 1)  
 Male, γ100 -.12*** .022 
 Age, γ200 .19*** .002 
 Divorced, Separated, or Widowed, γ300 -.43*** .031 
 Never Married, γ400 -.35*** .042 
 Primary Completed but Less than High School, γ500 .09** .032 
 High School, γ600 .11* .042 
 More Than High School, γ700 .16*** .039 
 Retired, γ800 -.07* .030 
 Not Working Other Than Retired, γ900 -.20*** .030 
 Income Decile, γ1000 .18*** .013 
 Squared Income, γ11000 -.02*** .003 
Dynamic Country Characteristics (Level 2)  
 Individualization, γ010 -.01  .050 
 Redistribution, γ020 .14** .043 
 Individualization*Redistribution, γ030 .06 .036 
 Time, γ040 -.01 .025 
 Squared time, γ050 .05** .017 
Enduring Country Characteristics (Level 3)  
 Traditional Values, γ001 .35** .107 
 GDP Per Capita (U.S. $1000), γ002 .53*** .073 
 Government Commitment to Social Security, γ003 .05 .089 
 Social Security Generosity, γ004 .24 .361 
Notes: Estimation of fixed effects using robust standard errors.   
* p < .05;  ** p < .01;  *** p < .001  (two tailed tests for all variables)  
(continued on next page)
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Table 7. (Continued) 
Fixed Effect Coeff. SE 
Cross-level Interactions (Level 2*Level 3)  
 Individualization*GDP per capita (U.S. $1000), γ011 .100* .040 
 Individualization*Gov. Commitment to Soc. Sec., γ012 .26** .074 
 Redistribution*Traditional-Secular Values, γ021 .19*** .042 
 
Random Effect 
Variance 
Component 
Std. 
Dev. 
Between Individuals Variance (Level 1)   
 Individual Life Satisfaction Variation, e 4.77 2.184 
Within Countries Variance (Level 2)   
 Country-Year Mean Life Satisfaction Variation, r0 .12*** .350 
Between Countries Variance (Level 3)   
 Country Mean Life Satisfaction Variation, u00 .52*** .718 
 Squared Time Effect Variation, u05 .01** .084 
 
Fit Statistics 
Explained Variance (Base = Null Model Variance Component) 
 Between Individuals (Level 1) =  4% (4.99) 
 Within Countries (Level 2)  =  33% (.18) 
 Between Countries (Level 3)  =  59%   (1.28) 
Deviance = 557663.224 
Number of estimated parameters = 29 
Notes: Estimation of fixed effects using robust standard errors. Chi-square significance tests for 
random effects are based on a smaller sample of units that had sufficient data for computation: 220 
of 234 units for level 2, and 77 of 91 for level 3.  Variance components estimates are based on all 
the data. 
* p < .05;  ** p < .01;  *** p < .001  (two tailed tests for all variables) 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Research on old-age pension policy and subjective well-being has made 
remarkable progress over the past decades.  However, the vast majority of this research 
runs on separate avenues, with comparative-historical sociology studying policy 
development mainly in Western Europe and OECD countries, sociology of aging and the 
life course looking at the intersection between policy and well-being mostly within the 
United States, and sociology of emotions and mental health largely focused on micro-
social processes and younger populations.  Bridging theoretical perspectives and 
integrating empirical work across fields has been particularly difficult due to the lack of 
reliable multilevel longitudinal data.  In this study, I address these limitations and explore 
avenues for cumulative theorizing by using a newly created dataset and three-level 
hierarchical linear models to understand the effects of pension policy on life satisfaction, 
as well as the factors that may moderate this relationship.  The data analyzed include 
126,560 older adults over the period 1981-2008 in 91 countries.  The inclusion of a large 
number of low- and middle-income countries over time provides a unique opportunity to 
answer the call for research on pension policy and subjective well-being to be more 
cross-national and dynamic in its orientation (e.g., Berkman et al. 2000; George 2006; 
Mares and Carnes 2009; Peterson 2007; Turner and Stets 2006; Yang 2008).  Four major 
findings emerged from this study. 
First, the results show that pension policy in recent decades has two main 
dimensions.  The first and most frequently studied dimension of variation in pension 
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policy is individualization, which taps variation in pooling of risk across countries with or 
without mandatory funded IRAs.  The emphasis of previous literature on the 
individualization or privatization of pensions has obscured the importance of 
redistribution, which is the second source of variation in pension policy. This second 
dimension is related to poverty prevention and income redistribution performed through 
non-contributory universal or targeted pensions funded and managed by public 
institutions.  Although the two-dimensional theory of pension policy has been formulated 
in previous theoretical research (Mares and Carnes 2009) and implied in previous 
comparative-historical research (e.g., Béland 2005b; Calvo, Bertranou, and Bertranou 
forthcoming; Kay and Sinha 2008), this is the first study that statistically demonstrates 
that individualization and redistribution are not in direct and unequivocal opposition.  
Future research on pension policy should conceptualize individualization and 
redistribution as separate dimensions.  Although it is true that on numerous occasions 
privatizing trends have been accompanied by a retrenchment of the welfare state from 
pension provision, treating individualization and redistribution as antithetical would be 
theoretically and empirically inaccurate. 
Second, the key challenge that pension reform poses to older adults’ life 
satisfaction is not that of living with a high degree of risk, but living in a world where 
strong public safety nets are weak, eroded, or dismantled.  Given the longstanding 
contention of risk society theory (e.g., Beck 1992; Giddens 1990, 1999; Habermas 2001; 
Luhmann 1993) that the process of individualization reduces well-being, it certainly 
seems plausible that individualized pension systems could decrease life satisfaction as 
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well.  In the context of planning and making choices about an uncertain retirement future, 
risk may become a subjectively experienced threat to life satisfaction and overall well-
being.  Yet evidence from this study does not support risk society theory of increasing 
uncertainty, anxiety, ambivalence, and ill-being associated with individualization of 
pension policy.  Rational choice theory is right in pointing out that individualization is 
not wholly about risk but also about an expansion of choice and opportunities for return 
(e.g., World Bank 1994).  However, as risk society theory is too pessimistic in predicting 
life satisfaction, rational choice theory is too optimistic in predicting the positive effect of 
pension individualization on life satisfaction.  I argue that the (positive or negative) 
impact of individualization on life satisfaction has been overstated because previous 
literature does not differentiate between individualization and redistribution.  Results 
from this study suggest that individualization neither boosts nor dampens life satisfaction 
when redistribution is held constant.  Variation in redistribution is what makes a 
difference for older adults’ life satisfaction.  This result is consistent with previous 
research that found a number of economic, health, and social benefits arising from non-
contributory pensions (e.g., Barrientos and Hulme 2008; Bertranou et al. 2002; Heikkilä 
and Kuivalainen 2002; Johnson and Williamson 2008). 
The third finding of this study is that the relationship between pension policy and 
life satisfaction is contingent on the macro-social context.  Pension policies are embedded 
in cultural and structural contexts that help explain how people react subjectively to these 
policies.  Results from this study provide support to my congruence/discrepancy theory 
about the interaction between pension policy and the cultural and economic context.  This 
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theory postulates that when pension policy is in conflict with the cultural and structural 
context, it tends to lower life satisfaction and to arouse negative emotions.  On the 
contrary, tight coupling between pension policy and the cultural and structural context 
increases life satisfaction and subjective well-being more generally.  Policy-culture and 
policy-economy discrepancies can happen when factors other than cultural values or 
economic need shape policy development.  For example, policy change is heavily 
influenced by institutional constraints stemming from previously enacted and current 
policies (Pierson 1994).  Class struggle and political organization is another important 
factor shaping policy development (Quadagno 2005)).  
Specifically, I find evidence for two situations in which the effect of pension 
policy significantly varies across cultural and structural-economic contexts.  First, the 
beneficial effect of redistribution on life satisfaction is stronger in traditional than in 
secular rational cultures.  These results are consistent with previous findings suggesting 
non-contributory (especially means-tested) pensions may be associated with stigma in 
secular-rational cultures (e.g., Barr 1992; Estes 2001; Quadagno 2005).  These results are 
theoretically sound, because secular-rational cultures are also characterized by a shift 
away from traditional institutions, including the state, which is in this case the primary 
provider of redistribution (Inglehart 2008).  In contrast, traditional cultures may have a 
more favorable attitude towards reliance on government funded pensions as well as on 
family support.  Furthermore, previous research suggests that traditional cultures tend to 
place God, nature, or the collectivity, rather than individual labor, as the ultimate origin 
of wealth (e.g., Bataille 1998; Calvo and Williamson 2008; Cousiño 1990; Cousiño and 
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Valenzuela 1994; Mauss 1967; Morandé 1984).  This, in turn, makes them more prone to 
engage in ritual exchanges of wealth that are extended to the welfare state in the form of 
circulation of a variety of goods and services, including old-age pensions.  In this context, 
welfare redistribution may be experienced as a legitimate transfer to which low-income 
groups are entitled. 
A second case for which the congruence/discrepancy theory holds true is 
represented by the interaction between individualization and the structural-economic 
context.  Results from this study suggest that the main challenge that individualization of 
pension policy poses for life satisfaction is not that of living with a high degree of risk, 
but living with a high degree of risk in a world where basic material needs have not been 
met.  Specifically, I find that the effects of individualization on life satisfaction are 
significant and negative for lower-income economies and significant and positive for 
more affluent economies.  On one hand, individuals living in a context of material 
scarcity have a structural disadvantage to bear risk. On the other hand, an affluent context 
protects individuals from risk and gives them more opportunities to enjoy choices and 
obtain returns.  For example, individuals living in wealthier economies may have greater 
exposure to financial education and literacy campaigns, and probably have more 
opportunities to delegate investment decisions to experts (Botty and Iyengar 2006).  The 
very existence of the structural disadvantage and affluence-related advantages puts into 
question the categorical claim of negative well-being outcomes of individualization made 
by risk theorists (e.g., Beck 1992; Giddens 1990, 1999).  It is clear that risk theory does 
not appreciate the full significance of structural, cultural, and other factors as they 
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influence and shape the subjective experience of risk in contemporary societies (Elliot 
2002). 
Last, but not least, government commitment to social security moderates the 
effects of pension policy on life satisfaction.  For the most part, in this study I explore the 
relationship between the welfare state and well-being by focusing on variations in the 
type of pension policy—more or less individualization and redistribution—and thus 
depart from previous research emphasizing overall social security expenditures (e.g., Di 
Tella, MacCulloch, and Oswald 2003; Ouweneel 2002; Pampel and Williamson 1989; 
Radcliff 2001; Veenhoven 2000).  However, I do take social security expenditures into 
account in the form of government commitment to social security (i.e., government 
expenditures on social security as a percentage of total government expenditures) and 
social security generosity (i.e., government expenditures on social security as a 
percentage, divided by the number of people age 60 and over).  Corroborating findings 
from previous studies and challenging lay conceptions, I find that—on average—life 
satisfaction is not higher in countries with governments strongly committed to social 
security and where social security benefits are more generous.  However, I find 
significant interactions between government commitment to social security and 
individualization.  Specifically, my results suggest that government commitment to social 
security buffers the detrimental effect of increased risk that individuals bear in highly 
individualized pension systems. These results provide moderate support for a neoclassic 
view where governments have unambiguously beneficial impact on the well-being of 
their citizens (see Bjørnskov, Dreher, and Fischer 2007).   
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5.1. Theoretical Implications 
This study is a first step in the direction of integrating literature on comparative-
historical policy analysis, sociology of aging and the life course, and sociology of 
emotions and mental health.  The theories and empirical findings discussed here may 
serve as a unifying force for the study of the impact of pension policy on the subjective 
well-being of older adults from a sociological perspective.  However, the implications of 
this study are beyond the substantive results on the controversy about the impact of 
pension policy on life satisfaction and the moderators of this relationship.   
Findings from this study advance theory in the field of comparative public policy 
and policy analysis.  Four theoretical postulates emerge in this domain.  First, social 
policy can be best characterized if one takes into account both institutional design and 
expenditures.  Second, the type of pension policy has two distinct sources of variation: 
individualization and redistribution.  Third, the outcomes of the type of pension policy 
are not independent from expenditures.  Fourth, the outcomes of the type of pension 
policy are shaped and constrained by culture and structure.  The emphasis of previous 
research on privatization, welfare expenditures, and institutional factors shaping policy 
development has resulted in little attention to redistribution, type of pension policy, and 
cultural and economic factors, respectively.  Future research will greatly benefit from an 
integrative approach. 
By modeling the interaction between pension policy and the cultural and 
structural context in shaping life satisfaction, the theory sketched here provides more 
explicit macro-foundations for micro-level outcomes.  Three major theoretical postulates 
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about the larger macro-social context in which subjective well-being forms and is 
sustained emerge from my findings.  First, when variations occur in public policies, 
individuals react emotionally to their new circumstances, especially to the distribution of 
needed resources, such as non-contributory pensions.  Second, the redistribution of risk 
has less subjective emotional impact than the redistribution of need.  Third, 
policy/context congruence is associated with improved subjective well-being and positive 
emotional arousal, while policy/context discrepancy has the reverse effect.  Future studies 
may consider other subjective well-being outcomes, policies, and age groups to test the 
generalizability of these postulates. 
 
5.2. Policy Implications 
The general study of pension policy and life satisfaction has intrinsic importance, 
as it affects the well-being of people and countries.  Most of us will face a period of life 
in which we will need to consume but will be unable to work, and the countries we live in 
will have to find a solution to provide us with enough retirement income, either to 
maintain previous standards of life or to prevent poverty.  Finding the right balance of 
public-private provision is a complicated task with great consequences for a larger 
fraction of the population, and should not be entirely abandoned to ideological 
preferences.  Findings from this study can help determine the right balance of public and 
private support systems for elderly populations in different economic and cultural 
contexts. 
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The current financial crisis proves that privatizing pension reforms have exposed 
individuals to too much risk.  Many individuals have seen their retirement income 
security severely affected as a result of the imperfect choices they made in this time of 
financial turmoil.  But what happens to their subjective well-being?  With most of my 
sample observed before the onset of this crisis, my findings may be underestimating the 
detrimental effects of individualization on life satisfaction.  However, I can make policy-
relevant generalizations for situations less extreme than a financial crisis.  Somewhat 
surprising, I find that individualization of risks—on average—does not have an impact on 
life satisfaction.  With pension reform on top of the policy agenda in many nations, a key 
finding of this study is that life satisfaction comes with sufficient level of redistribution 
and not with more or less individualization.   
The finding that with redistribution comes life satisfaction, the experience and 
challenges faced by countries that introduced IRAs, the changes in policies by 
international financing institutions, and the recent financial volatility and heavy losses 
experienced in financial markets may all serve as an incentive for countries to strengthen 
the poverty prevention and income redistribution component of their public pension 
systems.  However, it would be a mistake to assume that “one size fits all” in pension 
policy reform.  Although population aging and the associated problems of reforming the 
old-age pension systems are found around the world, results from this study suggest that 
the challenge of pension policy reform is context-specific. 
Analyzing all the possible contextual variations of pension policy reform 
influences on life satisfaction could be the focus of an entire new study.  However, a few 
 82
policy-relevant observations can be made.  Overall, the (positive or negative) impact of 
individualization on life satisfaction has been overestimated.  The choice and 
opportunities for returns that individualization brings are for the most part inseparable 
from increased risk.  However, there are important contextual variations.  On one side, 
individualization without redistribution can have disastrous consequences when taking 
place in low-income countries where governments are spending most of their resources in 
programs other than social security.  On the other side, individualization appears to be 
less of a problem when public pension redistribution is provided in parallel, affluence 
shields against the increased risks, and governments dedicate substantial efforts to 
provide social security.  From a policy perspective, individualization appears to be a 
resource-demanding alternative for pension reform.  In contrast, pension systems strong 
in the public safety net tend to boost life satisfaction, can have even more beneficial 
results in traditional cultures, and work better without demanding excessive commitment 
from the government.  
Evidence presented in this study suggests that pension policy redistribution is a 
better avenue than individualization to increase older adults’ life satisfaction.  This 
evidence is consistent with recent literature showing an emerging consensus about the 
effectiveness of social redistribution as a response to poverty, inequality, and 
vulnerability (e.g., Barrientos and Hulme 2008; Heikkilä and Kuivalainen 2002; Johnson 
and Williamson 2008).  Policymakers would benefit from looking closely at the social 
pensions introduced in countries such as South Africa and Chile.  In South Africa, the 
social pension reduced the scale of poverty among older people by 94 percent (Case and 
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Deaton 1998; Help Age International 2004; Help Age International 2006).  In Chile, 
almost half of the older adult population moved out of poverty when the government 
introduced the social pension (Bertranou et al 2002).  Of course, the decision to develop 
strong redistribution pensions should be weighted against creating other poverty 
prevention and income redistribution policies. 
 
5.3. Limitations and Future Research 
This project entailed the creation of a new dataset and the coding of many 
variables was not without difficulties.  Because most of the information for pension 
policy was only available in the form of qualitative description in printed reports, there 
was space for interpretation.  More than five people were involved in checking the 
quality of the data, but ambiguities and contradictions in the reports were frequent.  For 
example, the reports sometimes had sections indicating that the government was covering 
the whole cost of a means-tested pension, but these pensions were not mentioned 
anywhere else in the report, giving the impression that they did not existed or at least that 
no additional information was recorded on them.  I approached problems on a case by 
case basis, reviewing the history of each country, revising the coding criteria, and 
validating the decisions with a third person.  Although we came to an agreement in every 
single case, it is likely that a different group of researchers would have arrived to 
different conclusions in a number of cases.  Further data limitations include the 
insufficient number of people age 50 and over.  Because I used an age cut-off of 45 years, 
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I included in the analysis people that may be 20 or more years away from retirement, and 
thus it is likely that the results of this study are underestimating the effect of pension 
policy on life satisfaction.  
Limitations acknowledged, the data used in this study are unique in their size, 
scope, and longitudinal dimension, and provide exceptional opportunities for future 
research in a broad range of topics that were not addressed in this study.  First, future 
studies may explore if the effects of pension policy vary depending on the respondent 
individual characteristics.  As I argued that an affluent context provides opportunities to 
get benefits from individualization, an analogous mechanism may be operating at the 
individual level, where power and resources of various types are structured by age, class, 
gender, and other social categories.  Second, future studies may include a broader range 
of outcomes, including subjective health, happiness, morbidity, mortality, and functional 
health.  Looking at the dispersion or inequality in the distribution of these outcomes and 
life satisfaction could also be of interest. Third, future studies may model lagged effects 
of pension policy to explore if people adjust to the changes or react more strongly later 
on.  Does pension policy have a permanent or delayed effect on life satisfaction?  Fourth, 
after new waves of data are collected, it will be possible to observe more variation in 
cultural and material contexts within nations and thus ask how cultural changes and 
economic growth moderate the relationship between pension policy and life satisfaction.  
Fifth, future studies might explore competing cultural and structural explanations for the 
policy/context discrepancy theory.  Sixth, future studies may focus their attention on 
other welfare policies, including education, health, unemployment, and other areas.  
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Seventh, future studies may explore pension reform including a broader range of 
explanatory variables (e.g., financial dependency and religious values) and outcomes 
(e.g., corruption and economic growth).  Eighth, studies could explore pension policy 
trends across time.  
The three-level hierarchical linear modeling approach used in this study to 
analyze repeated cross-sections of multilevel data can be extended to addressing other 
questions that bear theoretical importance to sociological studies of public policy, macro-
social determinants of subjective well-being and emotions, and other multilevel 
phenomena.  Because we know disproportionally more about the determinants and 
outcomes of different public pension policies—as well as of the reform of these 
policies—in high-income countries, future studies should increasingly include low-
income countries.  This study is a first step in that direction.   
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Appendix Table A1. Sample Summary 
 Time Point1  Number of Individuals 
Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total   Mean  Total 
Albania 1998 2002         2  360  719 
Algeria 2002          1  304  304 
Andorra 2005          1  363  363 
Argentina 1984 1991 1995 1999 2006      5  448  2,240 
Armenia 1997          1  651  651 
Australia 1981 1995 2005        3  716  2,147 
Austria 1990 1999         2  804  1,607 
Azerbaijan 1997          1  505  505 
Bangladesh 1996 2002         2  290  580 
Belarus 1996 1990 2000        3  570  1,709 
Belgium 1981 1990 1999        3  910  2,730 
Brazil 1991 1997 2006        3  500  1,501 
Bulgaria 1997 1990 1999 2006       4  522  2,089 
Burkina Faso 2007          1  327  327 
Canada 1982 1990 2000        3  691  2,073 
Chile 1990 1996 2000 2005       4  420  1,680 
China - The People's Republic 1990 1995 2001 2007       4  540  2,160 
Colombia 1997 1998 2005        3  761  2,283 
Croatia 1996 1999         2  445  889 
Cyprus 2006              1   453  453 
Notes: 1 The numbers reported below the time period columns correspond to the calendar year of observation for each country. 
(continued on next page)
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Appendix Table A1. (Continued) 
 Time Point1  Number of Individuals 
Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total   Mean  Total 
Czechoslovakia 1998 1990 1991 1999       4  769  3,074 
Denmark 1981 1990 1999        3  461  1,383 
Dominican Republic 1996          1  38  38 
Egypt 2000 2008         2  1,035  2,069 
El Salvador 1999          1  391  391 
Estonia 1990 1996 1999        3  431  1,293 
Ethiopia 2007          1  148  148 
Finland 1990 1996 2000 2005       4  392  1,568 
France 1981 1990 1999 2006       4  525  2,100 
Georgia 1996          1  795  795 
Germany 1981 1990 1997 1999 2006      5  1,081  5,407 
Ghana 2007          1  337  337 
Greece 1999          1  305  305 
Hong Kong - China 2005          1  571  571 
Hungary 1982 1991 1998 1999       4  517  2,069 
Iceland 1984 1990 1999        3  304  912 
India 1990 1995 2001 2006       4  608  2,433 
Indonesia 2001 2006         2  518  1,036 
Iran - Islamic Republic of 2000 2007         2  545  1,090 
Iraq 2004 2006            2   660  1,320 
Notes: 1 The numbers reported below the time period columns correspond to the calendar year of observation for each country. 
(continued on next page)
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Appendix Table A1. (Continued) 
 Time Point1  Number of Individuals 
Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total  Mean  Total 
Ireland 1981 1990 1999        3  484  1,452 
Israel 2001          1  460  460 
Italy 1981 1990 1999 2005       4  701  2,805 
Japan 1981 1990 1995 2000 2005      5  534  2,670 
Jordan 2001 2007         2  313  626 
Korea - Republic of 1982 1990 2001 2005       4  396  1,582 
Kyrgyzstan 2003          1  276  276 
Latvia 1990 1996 1999        3  452  1,356 
Lithuania 1990 1997 1999        3  432  1,297 
Luxembourg 1999          1  441  441 
Macedonia 1998 2001         2  390  779 
Malaysia 2006          1  214  214 
Mali 2007          1  438  438 
Malta 1983 1991 1999        3  296  887 
Mexico 1990 1996 2000 2005       4  463  1,850 
Moldova - Republic of 1996 2002 2006        3  430  1,290 
Morocco 2001 2007         2  366  731 
Netherlands 1981 1990 1999 2006       4  442  1,767 
New Zealand 1998 2004         2  574  1,147 
Nigeria 1990 1995 2000          3  217  652 
Notes: 1 The numbers reported below the time period columns correspond to the calendar year of observation for each country. 
(continued on next page)
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Appendix Table A1. (Continued) 
 Time Point1  Number of Individuals 
Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total   Mean  Total 
Norway 1982 1990 1996        3  508  1,525 
Pakistan 2001          1  388  388 
Peru 1996 2001 2008        3  377  1,130 
Philippines 1996 2001         2  344  688 
Poland 1989 1990 1997 1999 2005      5  520  2,601 
Portugal 1990 1999         2  530  1,059 
Romania 1993 1998 1999 2005       4  644  2,577 
Russian Federation 1990 1995 1999 2006       4  974  3,896 
Rwanda 2007          1  337  337 
Saudi Arabia 2003          1  226  226 
Serbia 1996 2001 2006        3  593  1,780 
Singapore 2002          1  349  349 
Slovak Republic 1991 1990 1998 1999       4  444  1,776 
Slovenia 1992 1995 1999 2005       4  472  1,888 
South Africa 1990 1996 2001 2007       4  915  3,660 
Spain 1981 1990 1995 1999 2000 2007 6  842  5,050 
Sweden 1982 1990 1996 1999 2006      5  488  2,442 
Switzerland 1989 1996 2007        3  677  2,032 
Tanzania - United Republic of 2001          1  340  340 
Thailand 2007              1   738  738 
Notes: 1 The numbers reported below the time period columns correspond to the calendar year of observation for each country. 
(continued on next page)
 
 109
 
 
 
 
Appendix Table A1. (Continued) 
 Time Point1  Number of Individuals 
Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total  Mean  Total 
Trinidad and Tobago 2006          1  424  424 
Turkey 1990 1996 2001 2007       4  573  2,290 
Uganda 2001          1  98  98 
Ukraine 1996 1999 2006        3  771  2,313 
United Kingdom 1981 1990 1998 1999 2006      5  519  2,597 
United States 1982 1990 1995 1999 2006      5  750  3,750 
Uruguay 1996          1  514  514 
Venezuela 1996 2000         2  324  647 
Viet Nam 2001 2006         2  478  956 
Zambia 2007          1  182  182 
Zimbabwe 2001          1  238  238 
            
Total 91a 62 46 26 8 1 234b  493c  126,560d 
Notes: 1 The numbers reported below the time period columns correspond to the calendar year of observation for each country. 
a Total country level observations. 
b Total country-year level observations. 
c The number reported is the average individual sample size. 
d Total individual level observations. 
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Appendix Table A2. Country Average Life Satisfaction by Time Point 
Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 Mean SD 
Albania 4.77 5.16           4.97 .28 
Algeria 5.69            5.69 .00 
Andorra 7.14            7.14 .00 
Argentina 6.74 7.24 6.93 7.30 7.70        7.18 .37 
Armenia 4.33            4.33 .00 
Australia 7.89 7.58 7.31          7.59 .29 
Austria 7.87 8.03           7.95 .11 
Azerbaijan 5.39            5.39 .00 
Bangladesh 6.40 5.77           6.09 .45 
Belarus 5.51 4.35 4.84          4.90 .58 
Belgium 7.37 7.59 7.42          7.46 .12 
Brazil 7.37 7.15 7.65          7.39 .25 
Bulgaria 5.02 4.67 5.48 5.21         5.10 .34 
Burkina Faso 5.59            5.59 .00 
Canada 7.82 7.89 7.85          7.85 .04 
Chile 7.55 6.92 7.12 7.23         7.21 .26 
China - TPR 7.29 6.83 6.54 6.76         6.86 .32 
Colombia 8.18 8.42 8.30          8.30 .12 
Croatia 6.18 6.68           6.43 .35 
Cyprus 7.35            7.35 .00 
Czechoslovakia 6.37 6.84 6.40 7.07         6.67 .34 
Denmark 8.21 8.16 8.23          8.20 .04 
Dominican Republic 7.09            7.09 .00 
Egypt 5.36 5.78           5.57 .30 
El Salvador 7.48            7.48 .00 
Estonia 5.99 4.99 5.95          5.64 .57 
Ethiopia 5.00            5.00 .00 
Finland 7.68 7.78 7.86 7.84         7.79 .08 
France 6.71 6.78 7.01 6.86         6.84 .13 
Georgia 4.68            4.68 .00 
Germany 7.22 7.02 6.93 7.42 6.93        7.10 .21 
Ghana 6.12            6.12 .00 
Greece 6.68                6.68 .00 
Notes: Time points correspond to different years across countries. 
(continued on next page)
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Appendix Table A2. (Continued) 
Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 Mean SD 
Hong Kong - China 6.41            6.41 .00 
Hungary 6.90 6.02 5.85 5.80         6.14 .51 
Iceland 8.05 8.02 8.05          8.04 .02 
India 6.70 6.50 5.15 5.80         6.04 .71 
Indonesia 6.96 6.87           6.92 .06 
Iran - Islamic Republic of 6.38 6.43           6.41 .04 
Iraq 5.23 4.48           4.86 .53 
Ireland 7.81 7.88 8.21          7.97 .21 
Israel 7.03            7.03 .00 
Italy 6.65 7.30 7.16 6.88         7.00 .29 
Japan 6.54 6.49 6.61 6.47 6.99        6.62 .21 
Jordan 5.60 7.21           6.41 1.14 
Korea - Republic of 5.33 6.69 6.19 6.39         6.15 .58 
Kyrgyzstan 6.48            6.48 .00 
Latvia 5.70 4.91 5.27          5.29 .40 
Lithuania 6.02 5.00 5.21          5.41 .54 
Luxembourg 7.79            7.79 .00 
Macedonia 5.72 5.13           5.43 .42 
Malaysia 6.84            6.84 .00 
Mali 6.09            6.09 .00 
Malta 7.94 8.26 8.21          8.14 .17 
Mexico 7.41 7.52 8.11 8.20         7.81 .40 
Moldova - Republic of 3.72 4.58 5.45          4.58 .87 
Morocco 6.06 5.25           5.66 .57 
Netherlands 7.72 7.77 7.85 7.72         7.77 .06 
New Zealand 7.70 7.88           7.79 .13 
Nigeria 6.59 6.59 6.87          6.68 .16 
Norway 7.89 7.68 7.65          7.74 .13 
Pakistan 4.99            4.99 .00 
Peru 6.35 6.44 7.02          6.60 .36 
Philippines 6.84 6.65           6.75 .13 
Poland 6.63 6.52 6.42 6.20 7.01        6.56 .30 
Portugal 7.06 7.03           7.05 .02 
Notes: Time points correspond to different years across countries. 
(continued on next page)
 
 112
 
Appendix Table A2. (Continued) 
Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 Mean SD 
Romania 5.88 4.86 5.24 5.75          5.43 .47 
Russian Federation 5.37 4.46 4.65 6.14          5.16 .76 
Rwanda 4.97             4.97 .00 
Saudi Arabia 7.28             7.28 .00 
Serbia 5.56 5.62 6.00           5.73 .24 
Singapore 7.24             7.24 .00 
Slovak Republic 6.14 6.80 6.07 6.03          6.26 .36 
Slovenia 6.28 6.45 7.24 7.24           6.80 .51 
South Africa 6.73 6.09 6.31 7.19          6.58 .49 
Spain 6.59 7.14 6.62 7.08 6.98 7.31 6.95 .29 
Sweden 8.01 7.97 7.77 7.64 7.72         7.82 .16 
Switzerland 8.36 8.01 7.90           8.09 .24 
Tanzania - UR of 3.93             3.93 .00 
Thailand 7.22             7.22 .00 
Trinidad and Tobago 7.26             7.26 .00 
Turkey 6.40 6.18 5.62 7.46          6.42 .77 
Uganda 5.65             5.65 .00 
Ukraine 4.01 4.58 5.80           4.80 .91 
United Kingdom 7.55 7.49 7.58 7.40 7.55         7.51 .07 
United States 7.66 7.73 7.66 7.66 7.27         7.60 .18 
Uruguay 7.13             7.13 .00 
Venezuela 6.73 7.51            7.12 .55 
Viet Nam 6.51 7.09            6.80 .41 
Zambia 6.06             6.06 .00 
Zimbabwe 3.95             3.95 .00 
         
Mean 6.50 6.62 6.77 6.87 7.27 7.31 6.51 .23 
Notes: Time points correspond to different years across countries. 
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Appendix Table A3. Tetrachoric Correlation Matrix for Pension System 
Scales 
  IRAs SICL ITC MTUN GNC GCT 
Presence of Individual 
Retirement Accounts (IRAs) 1.00           
Old Social Insurance System 
was Closed or is Phasing Out 
(SICL) 
.79 1.00     
Insured Person Contributes 
More than a Third of Total 
Contributions (ITC) 
.89 .44 1.00    
Presence of Means-tested or 
Universal Non-contributory 
Pensions (MTUN) 
.11 -.10 .38 1.00   
Government Covers the 
Whole Cost of Non-
contributory Pensions (GNC) 
-.21 .02 -.15 .78 1.00  
Government Systematically 
Subsidizes the System, 
Regardless of Deficits (GCT) 
-.23 .31 -.46 .26 .80 1.00 
Notes: Frequencies adjusted when a cell has zero counts and tetrachoric correlations adjusted to 
be positive (semi)-definite. 
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Appendix Table A4. Correlation Matrix for Cultural Values Scale 
  GIM RAC RCC CHL AUT NPR ABO EUT
God is very important in 
respondent's life (GIM) 1.00               
Respondent attends 
church regularly in a 
calendar year (RAC) 
.75 1.00       
Respondent has quite a 
lot to a great deal of 
confidence in the 
country's churches 
(RCC) 
.84 .69 1.00      
It is more important for a 
child to learn obedience 
and religious faith than 
independence and 
determination (CHL) 
.82 .72 .71 1.00     
Respondent favors more 
respect for authority 
(AUT) 
.59 .53 .55 .69 1.00    
Respondent has strong 
sense of national pride 
(NPR) 
.74 .61 .59 .64 .59 1.00   
Abortion is never 
justifiable (ABO) .83 .74 .72 .75 .58 .59 1.00  
Euthanasia is never 
justifiable (EUT) .86 .74 .78 .75 .58 .66 .88 1.00 
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Appendix Figure A1. Bivariate Relationship Between GDP per capita and Survival 
Values 
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Appendix Figure A2. Non-linear Time Trends in Life Satisfaction 
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